green thoughts

Idiocy the Size of an Asteroid

2009-07-31T14:40:00.000-07:00

Recently, conservative writer Jonah Goldberg has suggested that mitigating climate change is a bad idea because the planet might be hit by an asteroid which would be a greater catastrophe than anthropogenic climate change due to the speed of the change and its cumulative impact. He writes of this potential impact,

So horrendous is the calamity that some even wonder if the enormous investment in fending off climate change might not have been better spent.

Now, I don't know what the probabilities are of an asteroid strike; however, his argument is bullshit for two reasons. First, there is no reason to suppose funding for "space object prevention" and climate change are a zero-sum game. When can address both. Second, by analogy, he should accept the following reasoning: I should continue smoking only if I can rule out the possibility of being struck by lightning. I can't, hence keep on puffing. Nonsense.

Will is Willfully Ignorant

2009-02-16T18:26:00.000-08:00

In the Washington Post, George Will challenges the claims made by Energy Secretary Chu. Chu claims that climate change may melt 90% of California's snowpack resulting in devastating effects to its agriculture. Will's challenge comes to this: People claimed in the 1970s that we would find ourselves in a new ice age due to "global cooling". Now, this proposition about global cooling is fairly common and has been refuted over and over. More importantly, Will has been refuted just on this point on in this article in the WaPo he repeats the EXACT SAME ARGUMENTS. An intellectually honest person responds to criticism or at least read them. And Will's father was an epistemologist...

Dobson on Obama

2008-06-24T18:34:00.001-07:00

Recently, evangelical James Dobson has criticized a 2006 speech that Barack Obama made on the relation between democracy and faith. Here is a quote from Dobson.

“And if I can’t get everyone to agree with me, it is undemocratic to try to pass legislation that I find offensive to the Scripture. That is a fruitcake interpretation of the Constitution” (Focus on the Family Broadcast).

“Am I required in a democracy to conform my efforts in the political arena to his bloody notion of what is right with regard to the lives of tiny babies?" (Focus on the Family Broadcast).

Here is Obama's own view of the matter.

“Democracy demands that the religiously motivated translate their concerns into universal, rather than religion-specific, values. It requires that their proposals be subject to argument, and amenable to reason. I may be opposed to abortion for religious reasons, but if I seek to pass a law banning the practice, I cannot simply point to the teachings of my church or evoke God's will. I have to explain why abortion violates some principle that is accessible to people of all faiths, including those with no faith at all” (A Call to Renewal).

So, consider one of the issues at stake, partial birth abortion. What Dobson is alleging is that Obama believes one should oppose this procedure only if everyone agrees that it is morally wrong. Clearly, this is not the case. Obama is actually arguing that one can oppose this procedure only if one can provide reasons independent of any religion regardless of whether everyone agrees or disagrees. This view is reasonable since the citation of a religious text will be treated as a reason to accept a position only if you already are a sincere believer in the claims of that text. Given we live in a time of religious pluralism, one cannot engage in reasonable dialogue by simply naively citing religious texts.

Incidentally, Obama opposes partial birth abortion personally but has voted against legislation banning partial birth abortion. Why? Because it would ban these abortions even if it would save the life of the mother. There is no inconsistency in recognizing the value of both the mother and the fetus' lives.

Preserving the Promised Land: The Environmental Legacy of MLK

2008-04-07T18:11:00.000-07:00

Several years ago, I was asked by the US Fish and Wildlife office in Portland, Oregon to speak on the topic of environmental justice and the legacy of Dr. Martin Luther King Jr. At the time, I was quite unsure of what to say; however, I went and read much of his work and found a rich treasure of ideas. In addition, I was born in Memphis, Tennessee and as a Southerner I was really interested in exploring his life. Below is the presentation I gave and what a very modest tribute to his life.

A Bit of Biography

Martin Luther King, Jr., was born in Atlanta, Georgia on January 15, 1929. Dr. King attended segregated public schools and graduated from high school at the age of fifteen; and received his B. A. degree in 1948 from Morehouse College. After three years of theological study at Crozer Theological Seminary in Pennsylvania, he was awarded the B.D. in 1951. With a fellowship won at Crozer, he enrolled at Boston University, completing his receiving his doctorate degree in 1955.

In 1954, Martin Luther King accepted the pastorate of his father’s (and grandfather’s) Dexter Avenue Baptist Church in Montgomery, Alabama. Deeply concerned with civil rights, King was a member of the executive committee of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, the leading organization of its kind in the nation. In December, 1955, he accepted the leadership of the first great African-American nonviolent demonstration of contemporary times in the United States, the bus boycott which lasted 382 days.

On December 21, 1956, after the Supreme Court of the United States had declared unconstitutional the laws requiring segregation on buses, blacks and whites rode the buses as equals. During these days of boycott, King was arrested, his home was bombed, he was subjected to personal abuse, but at the same time he emerged as the foremost African-American leader.

In 1957 he was elected president of the Southern Christian Leadership Conference, an organization formed to provide new leadership for the now burgeoning civil rights movement. The ideals for this organization he took from Christianity; its operational techniques from Mahatma Gandhi. In the eleven-year period between 1957 and 1968, King traveled over six million miles and spoke over twenty-five hundred times, appearing wherever there was injustice; and meanwhile he wrote five books as well as numerous articles.

In these years, he led a massive protest in Birmingham, Alabama, that caught the attention of the entire world and wrote his inspiring his "Letter from a Birmingham Jail".King planned the drives in Alabama for the registration of African-Americans as voters and he directed the peaceful march on Washington, D.C., of 250,000 people to whom he delivered his address, "l Have a Dream". He was arrested upwards of twenty times and assaulted at least four times; he was awarded five honorary degrees; was named Man of the Year by Time magazine in 1963; and became not only the symbolic leader of American blacks but also a world figure.

At the age of thirty-five, Martin Luther King, Jr., was the youngest man to have received the Nobel Peace Prize. When notified of his selection, he announced that he would turn over the prize money of $54,123 to the furtherance of the civil rights movement.

On the evening of April 4, 1968, while standing on the balcony of his motel room in Memphis, Tennessee, where he was to lead a protest march in sympathy with striking garbage workers of that city, he was assassinated.

King's Philosophy

Dr. King was fundamentally committed to creating a just society for all citizens in two fundamental senses.

Society should be just in the sense of distributive justice; that is, there should be an equitable distribution of costs and benefits in the society.

Society should be just in the sense of participative justice; that is, there should equal public participation in evaluating and apportioning these costs and benefits.

Dr. King was also committed to the method of non-violent resistance in accomplishing this mission. First, Dr. King believed that the use of boycotts, sit-ins, and non-cooperation were the “means to awaken a sense of moral shame in the opponent”. He writes,

True nonviolent resistance is not unrealistic submission to evil power. It is rather a courageous confrontation of evil by the power of love, in the faith that it is better to be the recipient of violence than the inflictor of it, since the latter only multiplies the existence of violence and bitterness in the universe, while the former may develop a sense of shame in the opponent, and thereby bring about a transformation and change of heart (44).

Second, the conflict over injustice was not between individuals but rather against larger societal forces; “between justice and injustice, between the forces of light and the forces of darkness. And if there is a victory it will be a victory not merely for fifty thousand Negroes, but a victory for justice and the forces of light”.

Third, nonviolent protest required the willingness to suffer. One has to be willing to suffer violence and go to jail if necessary. He writes,

The demonstrator agrees that it is better for him to suffer publicly for a short time to end the crippling evil of school segregation than to have generation after generation of children suffers in ignorance (129).

King’s Environmental Legacy

Dr. King never to my knowledge discussed environmental issues. Nonetheless, I believe much of what he believed and fought for can be applied to environmental issues of our day. [Of course, the environmental movement owes much of its success to that of the civil rights movement that came before]

First, Dr. King’s philosophy has obvious applicability to environmental justice in the narrowest sense. When minorities suffer most of the costs and few of the benefits of environmental decision-making, then we have an unjust situation. We should fight for distributive and participatory justice for these minorities.

Second, Dr. King believed that “Injustice anywhere is a threat to justice everywhere” (67). We can also apply King’s views to intergenerational justice or justice between generations. Thus,

Injustice any time is a threat to justice at every time.

Clearly, species of plants and animals have many different values.

Economic values – food, pharmaceuticals, fiber, and fuel
Ecological values – pollination, nutrient recycling, oxygen production, control pest, stabilize weather, etc.
Aesthetic values – hiking, climbing, bird-watching, etc.

If the current generation uses these species as if no generations will follow, then we are treating our children’s children unjustly. It is no different than the inequalities that Dr. King fought against.

Third, Dr. King argued that “Throughout slavery, the Negro was treated in a very inhuman fashion. He was a thing to be used, not a person to be respected” (17). He also writes, “To use the words of Martin Buber, the great Jewish philosoher, segregation substitutes an ‘I-it’ relationship for the ‘I-thou’ relationship, and ends up relegating persons to the status of things” (89). If you believe as I do, that species have a value that goes beyond their use; a moral or intrinsic value, then to treat species as mere things or resources is to perpetuate an injustice. Along with racism and sexism we might say with the philosopher Peter Singer there is speciesism – the view that we are the only species that matter morally. Thus, we must correct the injustice of how we treat plants and animals and recognize our direct obligations to the natural world. As Aldo Leopold wrote, “We abuse land because we regard it as a commodity belonging to us.”

Conclusion

Dr. King was surely correct that as we try to create environmental justice in our world, we must treat attempt to stir the moral conscience of others – this is the best and possibly only way to protect our natural heritage. We must also recognize that those who oppose preserving this heritage are often acting in the service of larger forces and we must target those larger forces at work – for example, over-consumption. Finally, we must recognize that to be environmentally aware one must suffer. As Aldo Leopold argued, “One of the penalties of an ecological education is that one lives alone in a world of wounds”.

We must with Dr. King see the Promised Land. In a very real sense, we must protect the land and it inhabitants given that has been promised to so many others.

Emissions Reduction; Singer versus Shue

2007-10-30T21:11:00.000-07:00

Here are per capita CO2 emissions:

US - 20 metric tons
China - 4 metric tons
Japan - 9 metric tons
India - >1 metric tons

Given that we must curb our greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions in order to prevent the negative effects of global climate change, what would be a fair allocation of GHG, or more specifically CO2 emissions, across individuals on the planet?

One proposal offered by Peter Singer, among other philosophers, is the following:

A fair distribution of the total amount of carbon emissions per person per year is 1/n where n is the number of metric tons of carbon per year which can be absorbed by the atmosphere.*

Many climatologists suggests that to avoid serious harms due to anthropogenic climate change, we must hold average surface temperatures below 2°C. If we suppose ∆T/∆CO2 = 2.5°C, then we must hold our CO2 emissions to about 450 ppm/year.
Currently, we emitting about 9 GtC per year and if we are to maintain our emissions at 450 ppm/year (and hence hopefully no more than 2°C warming), we must ultimately reduce our emissions to 3 GtC per year. So, the current fair emissions per person would be 1/9 GtC per year which must be reduced to 1/3 GtC per year. Singer offers this proposal in conjunction with carbon trading so that the economic impacts of reducing emissions occur over time.

Philosopher Henry Shue proposes that:

A fair distribution total amount of carbon emissions per person per year is at least 1/m where m is amount of emissions per capita on which a person can subsist.

Shue has argued elsewhere that each person has a basic right to the materials and resources to live a "modest" life. Since one cannot live such a life without emitting some quantity of GHG, then each individual should be accorded their fair minimal share. According to Shue, there are three relevant figures in determining how much we should reduce out emissions.

The "subsistence" minimum total (Sub ) = subsistence minimum per capita * global population
The "sustainable" maximum total (Sus) = the total amount of emissions allowable to avoid harmful effects of global climate change
The actual total emissions (Act)

Ideally, on Shue's proposal, the relationship between these quantities appears as follows:

Sus > Act > Sub

We would like our emissions to be below that which is required to avoid global climate change while still be above the level need for people over the world to subsist.

However, suppose in fact, the situation is as follows:

Sub > Sus

What is interesting is that Singer's and Shue's approaches diverge. That is, should we sacrifice future generations for present generations as Shue's proposal would recommend or should we sacrifice present individuals for future generations as Singer's approach would recommend?

*Adjusted for global population size in 2050. Note that as population size increases, the fair share plummets. So, we can remedy this problem by fixing a constant population size.

Framing Redux

2007-09-15T16:55:00.000-07:00

There has been a lot of back and forth online about "framing" and science. Much of it is a tempest in a teapot but I think it does raise important issues that need to be thought through... carefully.

At the core of the is what we might call the "rationalistic fallacy". Here it is:

If enough empirical facts are presented that support a claim p, then an individual or group should believe p.

Let p be any publicly controversial claim - all life shares at least one common ancestor, the average surface temperature of Earth is increasing due to fossil fuel emissions, etc. Folks like PZ Myers seem to accept the conditional above.

Much of the resistance to these contenders for p comes from various religious beliefs and values. For example, believing that a literal interpretation of the Bible is reasonable, humans are not related to primates, etc. prevent public acceptance of the basic tenets of evolutionary theory. These facts do not fit into the "frames" of evangelical Christians - their conceptual models - and hence they are denied as facts. The "New Atheists" suggest that we publicly and relentlessly attack those religious beliefs in accordance with the above conditional because they think eventually the public will change their mind. So, why consider the above conditional "fallacious"?*

First, an elementary point. As David Hume noted an "ought" does not simply follow from an "is". If an evangelical accepts that as many people as possible ought to go to heaven and not hell and believing in evolution by common descent will preempt such a future, then they will not accept it as a fact. Presenting evidence for common descent need not jostle the evaluative claim motivating them. Hence, the empirical evidence will be evidentially inert. To remedy this situation, you must engage the values not the facts per se.

Second, global climate change by and large will have its most dramatic effects on future generations. However, many evangelicals believe that the final judgment or the Last Days are in fact here. As such, there will be no future generations and they believe we should care about anthropogenic global warming only if there will be future generations. Hence, they don't believe we should care about anthropogenic global warming. Now to persuade these folks that we should mitigate AGW we must go directly after their theological beliefs. This supposes these are suspectible to rational criticism. This simply need not be the case. To put flesh on this point, consider a Bayesian analysis of these matters. Suppose I have a degree of belief with regard to the Last Days claim such that Pr(LD) = o.99. You present me with evidence E such that my posterior probability would be Pr(LD/E) = 0.001 if I conditionalized according to the rule Pr_new(H) = Pr_old(H/E). However, if I refuse to update my degree of belief in accordance with conditionalization rule what would you say? Try to persuade them with controversial diachronic Dutch book arguments? You get the point.

Finally, let's suppose the above arguments are correct that you cannot necessarily change a person's beliefs and values - to assume otherwise is to accept the rationalistic fallacy. Further suppose you have a choice between the following:

Enacting a policy A by framing p appropriately.
Not enacting a policy A by refusing to frame p appropriately.

If the policy is say teaching evolution in public high schools or reducing CO2, then I would argue that (1) is more important than (2) given the incredible importance of those goals. What I am also suggesting given the arguments above is that the following is not an option.

3. Enacting a policy A by refusing to frame p appropriately.

Hence the need to frame.

*Strictly speaking it is arguments that are fallacious and not statements. Nevertheless, the notion of a "rationalistic fallacy" is often discussed in these terms by framers so I use the term.

APEC and greenhouse gas intensity

2007-09-10T10:53:00.000-07:00

As politicians scramble to devise policies to deal with global climate change, one idea that is popular with the current administration and the recent APEC meeting is curtailing greenhouse gas intensity. Greenhouse gas intensity (GGI) is a measure of the ratio of greenhouse gas emissions to units of economic output.*

This is all the more important since it seems to be a central plank in the "agreement" over voluntary emissions discussed by APEC.

Here are the "aspirational goals" of the Sydney Declaration,

We are committed to the global objective of stabilizing greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous human interference with the climate system. The world needs to slow, stop and then reverse the growth of global greenhouse gas emissions.

Fair enough. What is the strategy for doing this? White House official Dan Price claims,

The APEC leaders and the declaration welcome the major economies meeting and the initiative of the United States. The declaration will call for parties to work towards a goal to reduce energy intensity by 25 percent by the year 2030, and to increase forest cover by 20 million hectares by the year 2020.

There are serious problems with the GGI. Specifically, the fundamental problem is this: you can reduce GGI without lowering greenhouse gas emissions. In other words, reducing this measure allows for increases in GHG emissions. Thus, the measure really does nothing to address the problem of global climate change. In fact, it does nothing to further the goals of Sydney Declaration.

To make the argument crystal clear here is a more specific example of the point. According to the American Council for an Energy-Efficient Economy, the GGI of the U.S. economy declined by 17% between 1990 - 2000, yet total GHG emissions increased during that time by 14% due to a 39% increase in economic activity.

The main reason that conservative politicians like Bush, Howard, and Harper are focusing on GGI is that it does not require cuts in economic activity. This is what we would expect from a President who once said about Kyoto that "the American lifestyle is not open to negotiation."

* Often this is calculated in terms of carbon emissions and not GHG emissions more generally.

Environmental Virtue Ethics

2007-09-08T13:55:00.001-07:00

At the moment, there is an interesting surge in the work done on Environmental Virtue Ethics (EVE). This is in large part do the work of folks like Philip Cafaro and Ronald Sandler who have an anthology and two respective monographs on the subject. In this post, I want to consider EVE.

First things first. I am a consequentialist. Whether a given action, rule, disposition, or character trait is morally correct depends solely on its consequences. That is, we evaluate all "options" along these lines. Second, it may very well turn out that the most appropriate "locus" or "target" for moral appraisal may be character traits instead of say actions or rules. That is, we can bring more good about in the world by focusing on character than actions or rules. For example, Dale Jamieson - a fellow consequentialist - has argued along these lines in dealing with global climate change. Now on to EVE...

Here is my criticism. We can recognize the importance of virtues and vices without adopting an EVE proper.

Whatever the virtues are - those character traits (dispositions to act, feel, and think) which are good - it seems unlikely that they will environmentally specific. For example, consider the virtue of humility which is some mixture of unpretentiousness and modesty. This has nothing to do with the environment per se. So, in what sense are there "environmental virtues"?

A true EVE would suggest it is good for us to have the virtues. Why would this be? A very common answer is because they benefit the possessor. However there are two problems with this. First, why are the benefits to me and only me so important- why do they not concerns benefits that accrue to others? Second, this is just a form of consequentialism applied to character traits and thus is not a distinctive form of EVE. One might argue that virtues are good to have for their own sake but now we need an argument for why there are intrinsically valuable.

So, though I am sympathetic to EVE in certain ways, I am unsure why character cannot simply be wrapped in existing moral theories.

Europe and U.S. Reach Climate Deal?

2007-06-07T10:46:00.000-07:00

Today, the NYTimes claims that Europe and the U.S. have reached a "climate deal". Though this is good news in some sense, it is by no means a "deal". Specifically, Chancellor Mrs. Angela Merkel wanted to produce agreement on several issues during these meetings.

G8 countries should reduce their greenhouse gas emissions by 50% by 2050.
G8 countries should increase energy efficiency by 20% by 2020.
Post-Kyoto agreements should occur through a international body; specifically the UN.

President Bush released his own plan right before the G8 meeting (coincidence?) which would bring together fifteen nations including the US, India, China, and Russia as leaders to agree on voluntary greenhouse gas reductions which would occur after 2012 by the end of 2008.

Note the differences between these approaches. First, there is no specific reduction target specified. Second, the two plans differ over the issue of voluntary reduction. Third, Bush's plan works independently or outside of the UN. So, a "climate deal" seems non-existent and the key European points are not part of the deal.

Nevertheless, Bush has finally conceded that anthropogenic climate change is occurring and that he is "deadly serious" (his term) about dealing with it. That is something I guess but in more skeptical moments I think he is just foisting the issue on the next President so we skip out on doing anything about it.

Thoughts on Scientific Consensus...

2007-05-28T11:36:00.000-07:00

Many contrarians (and others of course) make two rather obvious claims:

Scientific claims are not true in virtue of unanimous agreement with them.
Scientific claims are not shown true by unanimous agreement with them.

Why accept (1) and (2)? We all know of episodes in the history of science in which there was (near) unanimous assent to some proposition but it was latter shown to be false. [1] Thus, many contrarians assert, to concern ourselves with scientific consensus is simply let politics run science. Likewise, to reduce dissent is to undercut the scientific process. So, why should consensus matter with regard to issues of anthropogenic climate change or evolution where it is often discussed?

To zero in on the debate, let's use the following claim as an example:

(GW) Average surface temperatures are increasing mainly because of human fossil fuel use.

History of science Naomi Oreskes has argued forcefully that there is close to complete agreement amongst professional climate scientists on (GW)'s truth. So what?

A. Non-expert belief.

Suppose you are not a climatologist; should you believe (GW)? Well, if the majority of climatologists do believe it and you are in no position to seriously evaluate the evidence, then it seems that you should. Your evidence will not directly involve tree rings, glacial retreat, ice cores, satellite measurements, etc. since you don't understand that stuff. Rather, you must determine who is a reasonable authority on the issue and form you beliefs in accordance with their opinion. [2] The most reasonable method for doing this is a scientific context is to determine either a) who are the relevant peer-reviewed scientists who are competent with regard to (GW) or b) who are the scientific bodies composed of such individuals that offer summary statements about (GW)'s truth. Here is one way consensus matters - consensus is indirect evidence for a proposition's truth when you lack the relevant expertise. The next point follows on the coattails of this one.

B. Policy-Making.

We have to act with respect to climate change and its consequences. That is, there are a variety of future scenarios with non-zero probabilities which include a myriad of effects that concern our well-being. For each of those there are ethical "values" associated with those consequences. If you want to determine what to do with regard to those scenarios you must estimate what their respective probabilities are. Once again, if you are in no position to evaluate the probabilities of those scenarios, then you should depend on expert judgment. If there is near unanimous agreement on the science (and thus those probabilities), then you will act on the most likely future scenario. Here there is an ethical argument for following expert opinion since it is immoral to ignore consequences you have good reason to expect. Thus, the most prudent and ethical thing to do for non-expert policy-makers with regard to climate change is to consult experts and see what they believe the world is like. By the way, the IPCC is just such an organization for providing said expertise...

Scientific consensus - contrary to contrarians - does not threaten the process of science. Dissent is crucial for as we say "normal science". Critics should continue their criticism and battle it out in peer reviewed journals as they always do. However, when it comes to non-expert opinion and specifically environmental and educational policy, consensus matters a lot. This point simply pivots on drawing a distinction between what happens inside science and what happens outside of science as an institution. Thought they are often inextricably connected, they are conceptually distinct.

[1] For example, scientists believed that the Earth was at the center of the solar center and that species were and are unrelated by descent.

[2] Considering the following simple model. Suppose that a) the correctness of a expert's opinion is independent of the others and b) the probability that expert i is correct about a proposition is p. Hence, the probability that expert i is wrong is (1 - p). If the number of experts that agree with the proposition is n, then the probability that they are all correct is pⁿ. Likewise, the probability that they are all wrong is (1 - p)ⁿ. Hence, as n increases, the probability that they are all wrong decreases. It is unreasonable to think that each expert i judgment is independent of each other statistically speaking. Hence, we might make the model more complex by using conditional probabilities or suppose that research groups are statistically independent of one another though individuals in those groups are not (the variable i now represents a token research group).

Framing Science

2007-04-23T17:28:00.000-07:00

Recently, there has been a controversy over pieces by Matt Nisbet and Chris Mooney on "framing science". Consider some set of facts. A "frame" for those facts concerns how they are represented and as a result how they are interpreted by an audience. Social scientists generally think of people as having "perceptual filters" which structures what information they recognize and act on.

M & N are interested in framing especially in the context of scientific controversies. Scientists typically believe that a controversy will be resolved if and when the facts are provided and folks understand them. This is the "just the facts ma'am" strategy. N & M consider this the "popular science" frame. However, they suggest that empirical work in the social sciences suggests that public controversies are not resolved in this manner; this is in effect to buy into the "rationalistic fallacy" - the idea that people make up their minds about issues on the basis of "reason" rather than "emotion" (to put it simply). Here is what they say,

So in today's America, like it or not, those seeking a broader public acceptance of science must rethink their strategies for conveying knowledge. Especially on divisive issues, scientists should package their research to resonate with specific segments of the public. Data dumping -- about, say, the technical details of embryology -- is dull and off-putting to most people. And the Dawkins-inspired "science vs. religion" way of viewing things alienates those with strong religious convictions. Do scientists really have to portray their knowledge as a threat to the publics' beliefs? Can't science and religion just get along? A "science and religion coexistence" message conveyed by church leaders or by scientists who have reconciled the two in their own lives might convince even many devout Christians that evolution is no real threat to faith.

I agree with them on many of their claims. For example, there are a variety of ways of framing global climate change as a significantpolitical issue. One can represent it for conservatives as a opportunity for entrepreneurship and profits in new technologies; one can represent it is an moral demand of stewardship for evangelicals; more recently given the ties to national security one can represent as a likely cause of increased anti-American hostility as the result of scarce resources. Presenting the truth in motivating ways is simply effective communication for getting action on global climate change. Note here the issue is action not simply belief. Framing in climate change is not simply over whether humans are affecting the climate but what we should do about it.

(i.e., evolution at and above the species level). Hence, this frame shouldn't concern the However, on some of their other claims I find myself doubtful and these concern contexts of belief per se. Of course, how one frames the basics of evolutionary theory matters for belief (accepting humans are a descendent of a non-human species for example) and action (teaching said view in public school). Nevertheless, sometimes these issues get run together. Let's turn to evolution.

First, one important way to frame the importance of evolutionary biology and educating youth about it is through recognizing the importance of evolution for medicine. One cannot understand the virulence of diseases if one does not understand evolution by natural selection and high mutation rates. However, the IDers don't deny this - they are concerned with macroevolution. So, this frame does penetrate deep enough if you are really interested in teaching evolutionary biology. Second, some evolutionists like Richard Dawkins, Philip Kitcher, and William Provine argue that evolutionary theory does not sit comfortably with religious faith. Their arguments are different in their sophistication and structure, but we should take them seriously. Here is essentially the point that Kitcher makes. It is true that Christian belief can be made consistent with evolution; however, when we couple critical Biblical studies along with the findings of other sciences the compatibility of Christianity with the bulk of the natural and social sciences becomes difficult to defend. Whatever you think of his argument - it is not something that can be "framed away". My point is this: if Christian belief is not compatible with the scientific worldview, then saying that is "strictly speaking" compatible with evolution is problematic. The antecedent of the following conditional is huge, but the point is there.

So, I largely agree with N & M that framing science is crucial. However, I would disagree only in certain cases that there might be misrepresentation as opposed to framing in the case of evolution. Facts can be potrayed in different interpretive lights and if you want to engage the public over "sciency" issues, you best pay attention to it.

Foreman's fallacies...

2007-03-27T16:20:00.000-07:00

Recently, ex-Earth Firster and head of the Rewilding Institute Dave Foreman has written a piece on what he sees as the state of contemporary "environmentalism".

In a recent column, I argued that nature conservationists who work to protect wilderness areas and wild species should be called conservationists, and that resource conservationists, who wish to domesticate and manage lands and species for the benefit and use of humans, should be called resourcists. I also believe that nature conservationists are different birds than environmentalists, who work to protect human health from the ravages of industrialization, and that therefore there is not a single “environmental movement.

Fair enough, there are lots of views amongst environmentalists and it can be important to note their differences. However, he goes on to write:

When environmentalists turn their attention from the so-called “built environment” to nature, they can take either a conservationist or a resourcist pathway. I’ve named environmentalists who have a utilitarian resourcist view “enviro-resourcists.”

I presuming by "either...or..." Foreman means the "exclusive" or here. But the idea that one cannot be both a conservationists and a resource conservationist is a false dichotomy. One can be a supported of unmanaged wilderness in some places and a proponent of ecosysem management with respect to others. Suppose we introduce say grizzlies or grey wolves into some wilderness area; more often than not this will require active management. Likewise, suppose we choose to remove some invasive - we have to continually monitor that it is absent and often remove specimens when they reappear. To suppose that every environmental policy or action must involve rewilding is to ignore more complex and I dare say sensible positions.

He continues:

I’ve ruffled even more feathers lately by warning that enviro-resourcists have been slowing gaining control of conservation groups, thereby undercutting and weakening our effectiveness, and that nature lovers need to take back the conservation family.

Without empirical data, I am unsure how enviro-resourcists are weakening conservation groups, but it seems plausible to suppose that a mixed strategy mentioned above will always be stronger than a monistic view as articulated by Foreman. For example, forcing individuals to choose sides reduces common cause and makes conservation groups less effective since it lends itself to infighting. This surely is not good when you want to get things done.

Foreman goes on:

Regardless, it comes down to a love and respect for wild nature. Whether we are fully aware of it or not, I think we conservationists are enthralled by self-willed lands, waters, and animals…even when they are dangerous. We need to know that there are things undomesticated, carrying on their evolutionary adventures without regard for humans. We see forests, not two-by-fours; we see animals, not meat or pests; we see rivers, not hydroelectric power. At our deepest we believe that other species should be safeguarded for their own sakes, whether they have value of any kind for humans, or even if they are a threat or a bother.

This is a strawman for several reasons. One can value the natural world without believing it has intrinsic value and not see "board feet", "meat" or "hydroelectric power". For example, classic conservationists like Thoreau understood nature as valuable largely because of how it would transform us as people - we would become better people for having experienced it. This does not entail that the natural world has a "intrinsic value". Likewise, natural systems provide absolutely essential ecosystem services and these need not be priced at the margin or simply turned into commodities. Not everything of value - instrumental or otherwise - has a monetary value.

Here he is again:

Of course, humans also can enjoy and seek to preserve other species out of curiosity, for their beauty, because of their important ecological roles, and so on. But when it comes right down to it, we conservationists protect wild things for their own worth without requiring that they have an economic or even aesthetic value.

Here is he is conceding the point, but then ignores it. Suppose a species has economic or aesthetic value. We should protect any species on which the former depends - this is an "ecological value". Thus, even if a species lacks either economic, aesthetic, or even intrinsic value, there are other instrumental values species may have.

We conservationists need to reaffirm our biocentric values even if we worry that they may be a hard sell to the public, which, as several public opinion polls show, is not necessarily so.

I would like to see the opinion polls that Foreman is considering, but there is little reason to believe that conservative Republicans will be moved by such values. Those who affirm biocentric values are not the ones that need to be convinced it is precisely those on the other side of the issue that do. Bringing out intrinsic value is preaching to the choir.

Finally, consider the Rewilding Institutes general views:

Our work is based on these values. We strive to safeguard wildlands as legal wilderness areas or in like strictly protected categories. We shield endangered, threatened, and sensitive species. We bring back wolves, lynx, black-footed ferrets, bolson tortoises, humpbacked chubs, California condors, and peregrine falcons to their former homes. We fight dams on rivers that yet flow free. We guard the holiness of national parks. We try to block feckless off-road vehicle hooliganism; sue against careless logging, mining and energy extraction in wild places; cheer on with dollars those who confront whalers on the high seas; appeal sloppy, land-degrading livestock grazing practices.

As has been documented by many, this is a particularly North American conservationist project. Displacing people and securing wilderness works at best in places where there are few people. In the global South, this leads to injustice and is a singularly ineffective and morally dubious strategy. Moreover, it simply unrealistic to believe that every species, community, or ecosystem can be saved. There are tradeoffs and constraints - sometimes we will be forced to choose. This is true even if every species has intrinsic value. Foreman owes us realistic strategies for helping all of us figure how to prioritize projects. Saving everything is a non-starter...

In the end, I am a huge fan of wildness and do believe that natural objects have intrinsic value suitably construed.* However, I also believe that the natural world also contains irreplaceable instrumental values. Why should we need to choose between them?

*Foreman never actually provides an argument for the intrinsic value of natural objects. At best he suggest Arne Naess as having done so. He didn't. He suggested that it was an "intuition" or a "basic" attitude and as such you either share it or you don't. Likewise, he uses the following rhetorical question:

When someone asks you about a certain species, “Well, what good is it?” there is only one suitable answer, “Well. What good ARE YOU?”

This is a perfectly legitimate question but note that no argument or answer is provided. Suppose there is something which is intrinsically valuable. It doesn't follow that it is some non-human species or even individuals of the human species. Both are legitimate questions and
Foreman would do well to provide a reasoned answer.

Ann Coulter's BS on Global Warming

2007-03-10T17:15:00.000-08:00

Recently, Ann Coulter has decided to weigh on global warming. Normally I would leave such nonsense alone but her views are so ridiculous and heinous I figured I out to weigh in. So, here are some thoughts on her bile.

She writes,

Even right-wingers who know that "global warming" is a crock do not seem to grasp what the tree-huggers are demanding. Liberals want mass starvation and human devastation.

First, those who oppose unabated use of GHGs do not want mass starvation and human devastation. If she could produce one such quote to that effect I would take this seriously but of course she cannot. She is simply misportraying their views. Secondly, if those who want action on human-induced global warming are liberals and thus also want said starvation and devastation, then folks like Joe Leiberman, John McCain, and Arnold Schwartznegger are liberals. That is ridiculous.

She continues,

There are more reputable scientists defending astrology than defending "global warming," but liberals simply announce that the debate has been resolved in their favor and demand that we shut down all production.

That is just false. All of the major scientific organizations from the IPCC, AMA, and so on endorse the consensus on human-induced climate change. These are the most reputable scientists in the world on this topic. You simply cannot find even a handful of reputable scientists who endorse anything like astrology. BS.

She writes,

Liberals haven't the foggiest idea how the industrial world works. They act as if America could reduce its vast energy consumption by using fluorescent bulbs and driving hybrid cars rather than SUVs.

This is of course false. Environmentalists recommend these local actions to reduce one's production of GHGs, but the whole point of introducing legislation at the national and international level is to address the larger problem which simply cannot be addressed on a local level. Remember Kyoto Ann...

More,

"Global warming" is the left's pagan rage against mankind. If we can't produce industrial waste, then we can't produce. Some of us -- not the ones with mansions in Malibu and Nashville is my guess -- are going to have to die. To say we need to reduce our energy consumption is like saying we need to reduce our oxygen consumption.

First, there are plenty of evangelicals who are in favor of reducing CO2 emissions - are they "pagans"? Moreover, reducing energy consumption is nothing like reducing oxygen consumption. First, the issue is not primarily the reduction in the use of energy but in the consumption of fossil fuels. There are many strategies for doing this. Second, oxygen is not a non-renewable in the way that fossil fuels are and it does not have dire effects that excessive CO2 emissions do. So, this is a remarkable weak analogy.

Finally, she writes,

But global warming is the most insane, psychotic idea liberals have ever concocted to kill off "useless eaters." If we have to live in a pure "natural" environment like the Indians, then our entire transcontinental nation can only support about 1 million human beings. Sorry, fellas -- 299 million of you are going to have to go.

Yes, Ann, that is what these critics of anthropogenic global warming want; return us to pre-industrial civilization. Nonsense. To see what intelligent folks are really after consider the work of those at Princeton University are offering with their "stabilization wedge" approach. One might disagree with the approach for a variety of reasons but not because they are environmentalist wackos. These are exceptionally reasonable people and their approach has been explicitly endorsed by Al Gore.

All said, Ann Coulter's diatribe is all heat and no light. But, what else would we expect from such a venomous and immoral person.

asdadf

Economics, Future Generations, and Global Warming

2007-02-22T10:46:00.000-08:00

Recently, Sir Nicholas Stern, who is a top adviser to the British government, came to the United States to lecture on global climate change. Last fall he led a commission which released report which called for "urget action" on global warming. Very recently he went to Yale University to debate his proposal which essentially is this: Given the fact that we are warming the Earth in an unprecedented manner and that this is likely to lead to severe effects like droughts, species extinction, rising sea levels, melting sea ice, we must take serious action like a large carbon tax.

Stern was rebutted in debate by William Nordhaus and Robert Mendelsohn. The main argument they raised concerned discount rates and future generations. Customary economic practice has it that future benefits and costs are of less value that present benefits and costs - usually they use an equation like PV(t) = B(t)(1 + r)^t where PV is present value, B is benefits and r is a discount rate. So, $200 dollars twelve years from now at a 6% discount rate is worth $100 now. Stern's report essentially claims that present benefits/costs are of the same value as future benefits/costs.

The author David Leonhardt of the NYTimes piece on the debate essentially agrees with Nordhaus and Mendelsohn.

The problem is that none of us actually behave this way. If we really thought that our great-grandchild deserved our money as much as we do, we would never go out to dinner again. Instead, we would invest the $50 we would have spent on dinner, confident that it would grow over time and become perhaps $1,000 for our great-grandchild to put toward health care, education or a supercomputer. Any of that is preferable to our measly dinner.

The author of course ignores the fact that morality can be hard and we can be selfish; just because we don't do this doesn't mean that we shouldn't. Duh.

Here is the second argument:

But a dollar today truly is more valuable than a dollar a century from now. For one thing, your great-grandchild will almost certainly be richer than you are and won’t need your money as much as you do. So spending a dollar on carbon reduction today to avoid a dollar’s worth of economic damage in 2107 doesn’t make sense. We would be better off putting the money toward something likely to have a higher return than alternative energy, like education.

First, there is no gurantee that one's great-grandchild will be more wealthy than we are. We need to see an argument for that. Second, even supposing this is correct and even if putting a dollar to education instead of carbon reduction has a higher return, given that the effects of climate change are irreversible and could be devastating it would minimize costs to put it to such a reduction. That is, a dollar to carbon reduction would actually prevent larger costs latter - costs that could not at that time be avoided.

So, I conclude with a open question: from the point of view of morality, if we cannot discriminate with respect to race, gender, and so on what possible reason could we have that would justify discrimination with respect to the time at which one lives?

Non-skeptical heretics

2007-01-05T15:09:00.000-08:00

As many observers of the debates concerning climate change and its effects have noted, there is the fallacy of "false alternatives" at work. Either we are in for a environmental apocalpyse or it is a hoax. Obviously there is room in the middle. In a recent NYTimes article by Andrew Revkin, there is a discussion of what political scientists Roger Pielke Jr. calls "non-skeptical heretics" and their views on climate change.

After reading the article I found it difficult to pin down exactly how the views of these folks differs from the others in a sharp way. However, here is one way of doing it.

"Climate change presents a very real risk,” said Carl Wunsch, a climate and oceans expert at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. “It seems worth a very large premium to insure ourselves against the most catastrophic scenarios. Denying the risk seems utterly stupid. Claiming we can calculate the probabilities with any degree of skill seems equally stupid.”

The issue is over scientific uncertainty. Those in the proverbial middle would claim that we simply do not know or can estimate meaningful probabilities about the how much our climate will change and what the effects of those changes will be. The climate skeptics argue that we know or are justified in believing with relative certainty that climate change is a misnomer. Those who argue for apocalypse argue that we know or are justified in believing with relative certainty that catastrophic climate change is on its way.

The "non-skeptical heretics" argue that even if the changes in average surface temperature, sea-level, etc. cannot be determined with precision; nevertheless, the consequences of not preparing for such things would be unreasonable. Basically, in technical decision-theoretical terms, we are not making decisions under risk, but under uncertaintly. We cannot articulate probabilities for various outcomes.

It is important to note that argument above depends on how construes probabilities. If one is a subjectivist about probability, then essentially the probability of catastrophic climate change records one's degree of belief in that outcome. Thus, the argument over whether these probabilities are precise is a psychological problem. However, if one construes the probability of catastrophic climate change as a relative frequency claim, then it becomes very difficult to determine what those values would be. So, the IPCC defines probabilities along subjectivist lines.

Likewise, to suppose that we are making decisions under uncertainty - no exact probabilities available - does not mean that we do not know anything about the range of probable outcomes. For example, trivially we know that the probability of catastrophic climate change is between zero (impossible) and one (necessary). Otherwise, decision-making loses its pull.

In the end, these non-skeptical heretics do offer an important alternative to the recent rhetoric about climate change. There is reason to believe that talk of "environmental apocalypse" does more damage than good. Specifically, even if it raises concern it usually is accompained by feelings of no control. The world simply will go however it goes and we cannot do anything about it. That is exactly the wrong attitude to take.

p.s. Here is a very interesting post from Real Climate. It continues some of the observations I have made over "dramatic" heresy terminology but extends the analysis. Specifically, a heresy is generally some iconoclastic position taken by a minority. However, the views that these heretics take are fairly mainstream. So, even though Revkin is a very credible climate change journalist he seems to be looking for ways to make his report more exciting. Nevertheless, I take the point that the public needs to be educated that there are lot of folks between contrarians and doomsayers.

Pragmatisms

2006-12-20T16:50:00.000-08:00

(Note: this is a straightforward philosophy post) I have always been attracted to pragmatism - especially as articulated by Charles Sanders Peirce. However, it has not been obvious exactly what attracts me to the view.* As a way of understanding what pragmatism is, it is best to consider Peirce's "pragmatic maxim":

Consider what effects, that might conceivably have practical bearings, we conceive the object of our conception to have. Then, our conception of these effects is the whole of our conception of the object. (EP1: 132)

The pragmatic maxim is problematic when we construe the maxim as narrow criterion of meaning or truth.

First, and sometimes Peirce construes the maxim this way, we might suppose the meaning of the concept issues from the observations derived from propositions concerning that concept's application. Problem: This smacks of verificationism - the view that a proposition is meaningful if and only if it can be verified observationally. There are lots of problems with verificationism and here is one. Tyranosaurus rex had some typical coloring, unfortunately, skin doesn't fossilize. The claim that T. rex was generally blue is meaningful just in case there are observations which verify that claim. However, we don't have any relevant observations. Hence, the claim is meaningless. This is proposterous since it is meaningful we just don't know its truth. Thus, I reject the pragmatic maxim as a account of meaning construed in a verificationist manner.

Second, if we apply the maxim to the concept of truth we get the following from Peirce,

[T]he opinion which is fated to be ultiamtely agreed to by all who investigate, is what we mean by the truth, and the object represented in this opinion is the real (EP1: 139).

So a proposition is true just in case inquiry would agree with that proposition as it proceeded indefinately. Here there simply seems to be propositions whose truth or falsity we could never settle (this argument is similar to the dinosaur argument above). Presumably on Abraham Lincoln's 50th birthday (or exactly when he turned 50) there is a number of hairs he had on his head and a true proposition which states he had just that many hairs. However, there is no way for inquiry to come to agreement on just that proposition.** Hence, any (or most) claims of the form "Abe Lincoln had n hairs on his head on his 50th birthday" is neither true nor false. Problem: this flies in the face of basic tenet of logic that every proposition is either true or false and it conflates some claim's being true with our knowing it to be true.

My own Jamesian view is that the pragmatic maxim is best construed as a method of thinking. Whenever one considers a concept or belief one should ask how the world would be different if something had that property or if the claim were true? Put differently, what practical difference would a given belief or concept make in the world?

*I think the views of Williams James and John Dewey have much in their favor as well but in different respects than Peirce.

**One might argue that we could verify the coloring of T. rex and the number of hairs on Lincoln's head through time travel. However, according to our best physics, time travel apparently is not possible for creatures like us. So this is of no help.

Myers, Species Extinction, and Precaution

2006-12-13T12:11:00.000-08:00

Norman Myers writes the following interesting passages concerning species extinction and precaution in a debate with Julian Simon and quotes the passage in a review of Bjorn Lomborg's The Skeptical Environmentalist:

A skeptic might still object that if the extinctions are occurring in large numbers right now, why aren't they individually documented? How much precise evidence is there? To this, the pragmatic scientist responds that it is far easier to demonstrate that a species exists than that it does not. To achieve the first, all one has to do is to find a few specimens. To achieve the second with equal certainty, one would have to search every last locality of the species' range before finally being sure. This is alright for the purist. Unfortunately, we live in a world without sufficient scientists, funding, and, above all, time to undertake a conclusive check. Given that we are witnessing a mass extinction of exceptional scope, should it not be sufficient to make a best-judgment estimate of what is going on -- and in cases of uncertainty ("Has the species finally disappeared or is it still hanging on?"), assume that if a species has not been seen for decades, it should be considered to be extinct until it is proven to be extant? Conservation organizations generally require that a species fail to be recorded for 50 years before it can be designated in memoriam. In Peninsular Malaysia, a four-year search for 266 species of freshwater fish turned up only 122 of them, yet they are all officially regarded as still in existence.

Let us bear in mind, above all, that we are dealing with the irreversible loss of unique life forms. It is not always possible to detail the precise survival status of tens of thousands of threatened plant species and millions of animal species. In light of these factors, why shouldn't the burden of proof be shifted onto the shoulders of the skeptics, so that they must prove a species' existence rather than the reverse?

This brings up a key question as concerns species extinctions. What is "legitimate scientific caution" in the face of uncertainty? Uncertainty can cut both ways. Some observers may object that in the absence of conclusive evidence and analysis, it is appropriate to stick with low estimates of species extinctions on the grounds that they are more "responsible." But how about the crucial factor of asymmetry of evaluation? A low estimate, ostensibly "safe" because it takes a conservative view of such limited evidence, may fail to reflect the real situation just as much as an "unduly" high estimate that is more of a best-judgment affair, based on all available evidence with varying degrees of demonstrable validity. In a situation of uncertainty where not all parameters can be quantified to conventional satisfaction, let us not get hung up on what can be counted today if that is to the detriment of what ultimately counts. Undue caution can readily become recklessness; and as in other situations beset with uncertainty, it will be better for us to find we have been roughly right than precisely wrong.

A few comments:

Myers' point can be best understood by considering the following argument: If an anthropogenic mass extinction is occurring, we should see many, many extinctions. However, we don't see such extinctions. Hence, there is no such mass extinction occurring. There are independently verifiable reasons (which Myers gave) for recognizing that an anthropogenic mass extinction could be occurring and we are not observing lots of particular species going extinct.
Myers suggests that since we are irreversiably losing "life forms" the burden of proof should shift to the skeptics to "prove" that a species exists. Here I think Myers is wrong. There are many things which exist which if destroyed would be an irreversiable loss (i.e., the specific quarter in my pocket); however, none of us would think they mattered. The only reason I can see the burden of proof shifting is not because of a irreversiably losing species but because we are irreversiably losing values provided or possessed by said species.
Insofar as we are choosing between say protecting the habitat of species versus opening up that parcel of land for development, there may be irreversiable losses of value on both sides. For example, if we set up as a reserve some patch of rainforest, this may take away much needed sources of food for local people. In fact, their lives may be cut short as the result of conservation actions. If this little thought experiment actually occurred, one could argue just such competing irreversiable losses were in tension. The salient point here is that citing the irreversiable loss of value provided or possessed by species to argue for preserving them is not sufficient - we have to weigh all of the values against one another.

The Commons and GW

2006-12-04T12:36:00.000-08:00

Sometimes people say things that are inane. Tim Blair writing for the Daily Telegraph has done just that. He notes that Australia produces 1.4% and Canada 2% of total greenhouse gases emissions and then writes,

Think on this awhile: if a vengeful Gaia were to smite both Canada AND Australia out of existence, that would reduce by only 3.4 per cent of these warming gases some believe are killing the planet.

Completely removing them would make next to no difference at all, global-warming wise. So imagine how little effect a council recycling scheme has, for example. Or how pointless would be the purchase of a hybrid electric car.

A Kantian point: Of course, one can concede all of this and note that it has no implications for GW international policy. Consider the following analogy. Suppose I steal some commodity at my local grocery. Presumably the effects of such theft is small at best. Preventing my stealing also would have very little significance as well and probably the benefits of preventing it would be less than the costs. Now suppose most everyone who goes to this grocery steals as well. The effects of such ensemble theft would be extremely bad for the store and probably for us as well. Just because one action has a negligible negative effect does not entail that many of such actions will have a similarly negligible negative effect.

A Contractarian point: If countries opt out of GW international policies or treaties, then it creates an incentative for other countries to do the same. Thus, though the benefits that would acrue for not complying would be positive, then effects of doing so given that others will opt out as well given your "free-riding" can dramatically increase the costs. So, in order to avoid serious costs due to GHG emissions, countries should abide by such policies or treaties. Provided of course that they are fair.

One proposal would be the following: Suppose that the atmospheric sink can absorb n metric tons of GHGs per year. A completely equitable allocation of GHG emissions would be 1/n per person. In the US, the per capita emissions are 5 metric tons per year - five times what is fair according to this scheme. China for example has a per capita emissions of 0.76 metric tons per year - less than what is fair. We can further correct the fair per capita emissions rate by considering past C02 emissions, population size of a country, etc; one gets the point.*

A couple of other points. First, GW is not "killing the planet" since the planet is not a living organism. Even if that is just metaphor on Blair's part, he writes the following as well:

Here's another perspective-building figure: "recorded history" (the last 200 years or so) represents just 0.000004 per cent of the planet's entire 4.6 billion year existence. This joint's been around a long time. We'll barely make a dent in it.

The issue is not whether the planet will survive GW - of course it will. It is what will happen to us and other living things. So this is just a red herring.

Finally, Blair laments what Kyoto would do for Australia and New Zealand. As a matter of fact, Australia under Kyoto would be allowed to increase its emissions given it is a net energy producing country, growing population, and need for transportation. Of course like the US, they did not ratify the treaty. New Zealand on the other hand is not required to reduce the GHGs between 2008-2012.

*The proposal discussed comes from among others Peter Singer in his One World.

The Rough Guide to Climate Change

2006-11-16T20:08:00.000-08:00

I just came across this new book from Robert Henson a trained meterologist and science writer and I recommend it wholeheartedly. On occasion you find a book that goes into depth concerning the science and politics of climate change and this is certainly one such book. It is written in a breezy style but goes into detail where it matters. Here the detail matters. So, check it out.

http://www.amazon.com/Rough-Guide-Climate-Change-Reference/
dp/1843537117

The Late Late Show on Rumsfeld

2006-11-11T13:31:00.000-08:00

This is pretty funny check it out...

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nDJ5Z55DT_k

The Fact of Evolution

2006-11-08T12:57:00.000-08:00

It usual for evolutionists to argue that evolution is a fact. That is, there is for example the fact that all organisms are related by one (or a few) common ancestors. This is undeniable given our best science. This fact is different than say theories concerning the evolution of wings or the near neutrality of molecular evolution; they are contested and there is no obvious consensus about them.

This distinction articulated by the likes of Stephen Jay Gould among others is a useful one. However, when employing against intelligent designers is strikes me as less than effective. If a IDer claims that evolutionary biology is contentious then it is correct to claim that some claims made by evolutionists are not contentious in the least like common descent. However, there are two readings as to what a fact is:

A fact is a truth about the world.

A fact is a claim about the world largely accepted by experts (on the basis of evidence).

If a evolutionist argues that evolutionary biology is not as contentious as IDers suggest since it is a fact in former sense that all organisms are related then given the IDers denial of this purported truth, they are simply begging the question. The IDer rightfully ignores the argument. However, if an evolution argues that evolutionary biology is not as contentious as IDers suggest since it is a fact in the latter sense that all organisms are related then this is reasonable argument.

The upshot is when discussing "fact versus theory" in debates over evolution the appropriate contrast is not between "facts" and theory but between claims with different degrees of evidential support which the scientific community recognizes as such.

Bill McKibben on the End of Nature

2006-09-28T20:38:00.000-07:00

Bill McKibben in his classic The End of Nature argues that nature has ceased to exist. As I understand his argument it goes something like this. As the result of anthropogenic climate change, we are and will be affecting the most basic patterns of weather on our planet. This in turn will affect the characteristics of all animal and plant species. Moreover, since our very idea of nature requires the existence of non-human nature, the “domestication” of the planet will jeopardize the idea of nature and its meaning and significance. Nature and our idea of nature will come to an end. In the rest of this section, I will work through argument and provide response to it.

McKibben writes,

An idea, a relationship, can go extinct, just like an animal or a plant. The idea in this case is “nature,” the separate and wild province, the world apart from man to which he adapted, under whose rules he was born and died. In the past, we spoiled and polluted parts of that nature, inflicted environmental “damage.” But that was like stabbing a man with toothpicks: though it hurt, annoyed degraded, it did not touch vital organs, block the path of the lymph or blood. We never thought that we had wrecked nature. Deep down, we never really thought we could: it was too big and too old; its forces – the wind, the rain, the sun – were too strong too elemental. But quite by accident, it turned out that the carbon dioxide and other gases we were producing in our pursuit of a better life – in pursuit of warm houses and eternal economic growth and of agriculture so productive it would free most of us from farming – could alter the power of the sun, could increase its heat. And that increase could change the patterns of moisture and dryness, breed storms in new places, breed deserts. These things may or may not have yet begun to happen, but it is too late to altogether prevent them from happening. We have produced the carbon dioxide – we are ending nature. (1989, 48)

There are two claims of importance here. The first is that through anthropogenic climate change, we are affecting the entire biosphere. If nature consists in those material objects and processes independent of human interaction and climate change is such that it affects all material objects and processes, then nature so understood will cease to exist – nature is coming to an end. The second is that somehow our idea of nature – our representation of this nature and its significance will similarly also come to an end.

Both of these claims are interesting. The first this is:

Anthropogenic climate change affects the characteristics of all animal and plant species.

As McKibben suggests,

The greenhouse effect is a more apt name than those who coined it imagined. The carbon dioxide and trace gases act like the panes of glass on a greenhouse – the analogy is accurate. But it’s more than that. We have built a greenhouse, a human creation, where once there bloomed a sweet and wild garden. (1989, 91)

This is a relatively straightforward empirical claim. That is, it is either true or false in accordance with the facts; it may be difficult to determine if it is true or false but that is a different matter. I will consider it in more detail below. The second claim is this:

If nature ends, then so will our idea of nature.

This seems to be rather implausible when one thinks about it. There are many ideas that we have which do not represent or refer to anything. For example, there is no such thing as phlogiston. According to the rejected theory, all flammable materials contain phlogiston which is without color, odor, taste, or weight and when something burns it releases the substance. As it turns out some substances like magnesium when burned gain weight which is contrary to phlogiston theory. Moreover, we have discovered that for objects to combust they require oxygen and this in turn explained why substances like magnesium gained weight. The point here is that we still have the idea of phlogiston but no such thing exists. By analogy, it seems that one of McKibben’s key claims is false: even if nature ends, there is no reason to believe that our idea of nature will do so as well.

Nevertheless, McKibben would not be satisfied with this response. He writes,

We have not ended rainfall or sunlight; in fact, rainfall and sunlight may become more important forces in our lives…But the meaning of the wind, the sun, the rain – of nature – has already changed. Yes, the wind still blows – but no longer from some other sphere, some inhuman place. (1989, 48)

It is not the idea of nature per se that ceases but rather its meaning. This is not “meaning” in the sense of intension but in terms of its significance.

The idea of nature will not survive the new global pollution – the carbon dioxide and the CFCs and the like. This new rupture with nature is different not only in scope but also in kind from salmon tins in an English stream. We have changed the atmosphere and thus we are changing the weather. By changing the weather, we make every spot on earth man-made and artificial. We have deprived nature of its independence, and that is fatal to its meaning. Nature’s independence is its meaning without it there is nothing but us. (1989, 58)

So the analogy I offered above is rather weak. McKibben can concede that we may retain the notion of nature but how this idea affects us will cease without nature. He also contends that the idea of nature and its significance is something we actually need.

But still we feel the need for pristine places, places substantially unaltered by man. Even if we do not visit them, they matter to us. We need to know that though we are surrounded by buildings there are vast places where the world goes on as it always has. The Artic National Wildlife Refuge, on Alaska’s northern shore, is reached by just a few hundred people a year, but it has a vivid life in the minds of many more, who are upset that oil companies want to drill there. And upset not only because it many or many not harm the caribou but because here is a vast space free of roads and buildings and antennas, a blank spot if not on the map then on the surface. It sickens us to hear that “improper waste disposal practices” at the American Antarctic research station in McMurdo Sound have likely spread toxic waster on that remove continent, or that an Exxon tanker has foundered off the port of Valdez, tarring the beaches with petroleum. (1989, 54 – 55).

As best as I can tell, the reason why unaltered objects, processes, and places are needed is because it is through them that we can obtain certain virtues and character traits. For example, it is through our experiences of the non-human – direct or indirect – that we recognizes our own limitations and find the virtue of humility.

How are we to be humble in any way if we have taken over as creators? Thoreau once stood in the woods watching “an insect crawling amid the pine needle on the forest floor, and endeavoring to conceal itself from my sight.” It reminded him, he said (and Thoreau was not an especially humble man) of “the greater Benefactor and Intelligence that stands over me, the human insect.” But what stands over us? (1989, 80)

By affecting our climate we are acting as gods something early naturalists ruled out as simply impossible.

Moreover, it is through recognizing that “[t]he earth is a museum of divine intent” (1989, 70) we also recognize the transcendental in our own lives. We are not here of our own making.

The chief lesson is that the world displays a lovely order, an order comforting in its intricacy. And the most appealing part of this harmony, perhaps, is its permanence – the sense that we are part of something with roots stretching back nearly forever, and branches reaching forward just as far. Purely human life provides only a partial fulfillment o this desire for a kind of immortality. (1989, 73)

In Job, we learn that,

God seems to be insisting that we are not the center of the universe, that he is quite happy if it is rains where there are no people, a radical departure from our most ingrained notions. (1989, 76)

So, if nature comes to an end, the significance of our idea of nature will come to an end as well. This matters because it is through the recognition of nature that we come to inculcate the virtue of humility and a sense of the transcendent.

I now want to evaluate the two claims we isolated in McKibben’s argument. The first was that anthropogenic climate change affects the characteristics of all animal and plant species. As we noted with Cronon’s argument, many environmental historians and writers fixate on the fact that there is little nature little left. That is, in some way, almost the entire natural world has been affected by human activities. For the moment, let’s concede this point. This would say almost nothing about whether there are still relatively natural or wild objects, processes, or places left. That is, many environmental objects could exist relatively unaffected by human actions and would natural or wild to a great degree. Moreover, I would suggest that as a matter of fact, this is precisely what matters to us. It is not the existence of wholly natural or wild things that is required for of idea of nature or wildness to have significance; rather, we want more or less natural or wild things to exist. To suggest that elevating temperatures renders environmental objects as domesticated as McKibben does is to fall for the fallacy of black and white thinking. Either something is wild or it is not; either something is natural or it is not.

In order to substantiate the claim that there are relatively natural or wild objects, processes, and places I will proceed in two steps. First, I will examine the state of wild places independent of climate change. Second, I will do so considering the project impacts of anthropogenic climate change. In both cases, the relatively wild persists.

Recently, Eric Sanderson, Malanding Jaiteh, Marc Levy, Kent Redford, Antoinette Wannebo, and Gillian Woolmer (2002) have collected data from various agencies using GIS and have mapped what they called the “human footprint” on the Earth. They mapped human influence using four types of data as various proxies including human population density, land transformation (habitat loss and fragmentation), accessibility, and electrical power infrastructure. They then summed the scores creating a human influence index. As they note, “For example, an absolute score of 25 in the mixed broadleaf forests of North America might have a different effect, and definitely has a different biological context” (2001, 897). Thus, they normalized the scores relative to biomes in larger biogeographic realms. In the end, they then assigned a human influence index to each grid of each biome. The resulting percentages represent the human influence relative to biomes in biogeographic realms on the earth.

The results are as follows. Approximately 83% of the land surface of the planet and 98% of those areas where it is possible to grow rice, wheat, or maize is directly influenced by humans – this is for those areas where the human influence index is greater than zero. Brownsville, Texas is the only place which achieved the theoretical maximum value of 72. The highest scoring top 10% consists in a list of cities which one most certainly expects: New York City, Mexico City, Calcutta, Beijing, Durban, São Paulo, and London amongst others. The areas which received the minimum score of zero include parts of the boreal forests of Canada and Russia, the desert regions of Africa and Central Australia, the Arctic tundra, and in the Amazon Basin. Approximately 60% of the planet is along the continuum between the maximum and minimum values of the human influence index. The implication of their work is clear: our planet is more or less domesticated; it is more or less wild depending on where one is. They write,

We know that some aspects of nature survive, and even thrive, in the midst of our cities, while even in the wildest places, human influence frequently has reduced or is reducing natural values. Yet it is in these wildest places that the greatest freedom and opportunity to conserve the full range of nature still exists. (2001, 897)

There is great variation in the degree of wildness – the inverse of the human influence index – between biomes and with the respect to cities, towns, and states themselves. As Sanderson writes,

The human footprint was devised as a yardstick of wildness, and what it shows is that most of the world is neither wild nor not wild, which is to say, most of the world is somewhere in between. Look out your window. What most of us see are some roads, towns, croplands, lights at night, and some nature: the rain falling, plants growing, a few birds, and maybe, if you’re luck, occasionally some larger animals slipping by. (2005, 17)

Thus, the assumption that our world is either natural or it is not, or that it is wild or it is not, it just too simple.

They concluded their study by determining the “last of the wild”. This is the 10% of areas in each biome which was the most wild and from this set they picked the ten largest contiguous places. Insofar as one is interested in preserving relatively wild objects, processes, and places their work serves as a first-pass in finding such areas.

The work of Sanderson et. al. is extremely useful for highlighting the fallacy of black and white thinking in McKibben’s arguments. However, as they note, their work does not take into account the projects for anthropogenic climate change. McKibben could certainly concede the implications of their work and yet believe that climate change will have a far more homogenizing effect on the characteristics of animal and plant species and the places in which they live.

It is very difficult to determine the impacts of climate change in the future especially at the continental and regional level. As we shall see in a later chapter, climatologists use models with measured atmosphere concentrations of CO2 to simulate both past climates and they must predict future atmospheric concentrations of CO2 along with other greenhouse gases to project future climates. Since we cannot predict with precision how populations will grow, how energy will be used, and how agriculture and industry will change, scientists devise alternative plausible scenarios for how emissions might increase. These input scenarios can then used with climate models to predict future impacts. Different groups have devised different models and so one way of comparing models with respect to scenarios is to consider their “sensitivity”. If we take pre-industrial atmospheric concentration of CO2 and double it such that it no longer changes, then we find that the current range of climate sensitivity amongst different models is 1.5 – 4.5°C. The range mentioned has changed little over the last decade or two and can be thought of as one measure of the uncertainty of the climate models in use.

One important caveat here is that this is not the same as projecting how much and how fast the earth will warm in the future. In order to project this, one must include uncertainty with respect to both emission trends and in the climate’s response to such trends. If we project average global surface temperature over several models and over all thirty-five International Panel of Climate Change scenarios, then we find that by 2100 the expected annual-average warming is between 1.4 and 5.8°C by 2100. This would imply a global mean sea level rise between 20 and 88 cm by 2100. The upshot of these averages is that coastal regions, storms and floods, human health, water resources, farming and agriculture, and finally biodiversity will all be affected.

Regional predictions concerning impacts are more difficult that global ones concerning average temperature simply because the models must have a far greater resolution. Increases in temperature in different biomes will respond differently as well as in different seasons and even if they occur at night or during the day. Precipitation, humidity, and winds also play a much greater role in regional dynamics.

One relatively well-understood impact is that of sea-level rise which could be between 10 to 90 cm due to glaciers melting and the thermal expansion of the sea water itself. The nature of the effects of sea-level rise will be crucially dependent on where they occur. For example, in wealthy countries like the United States several feet could be added to sea walls provided the government and national agencies care to do so (Katrina withstanding). Moreover, areas with residences, businesses, and farmland could be abandoned if they were considered to difficult to protect. However, the places that would be most affected by climate change are those small islands and areas which occur near river deltas. For example, Bangladesh, Egypt, Nigeria and Thailand could be hard hit.

Another example of relatively well-understood impact is the effect of increased sea-surface temperatures on intensity of tropical hurricanes and typhoons. Climatologists believe there are good reasons for expecting the intensity of these storms to increase as temperature increases in the tropical latitudes. However, there is less confidence that this will occur with respect to mid-latitude storms.

There are other projections which are even less certain. For example, temperatures will increase more over land than over sea, more warming will occur at night than in the daytime and more warming is expected in the middle and high latitudes of our planet. In the Artic and sub-Artic, there will be thawing of permafrost and the thinning and retreat of sea ice. It is also believed that average precipitation will increase where more of the total annual rainfall will consist in downpours which lead to soil erosion. If this occurs in conjunction with warmer summers, then we could see both in increases in regional flooding and drought. Biodiversity will also be affect as animals and plants more poleward and to higher elevations. Types of ecosystems will become increasingly scarce as well – for example, in the lower forty-eight states we will see less and less of alpine, coastal mangrove, coral reef, and desert ecosystems.

So, the picture I have just sketched supposes that the mid-latitude, wealthy countries like the US, Europe, and Japan might suffer minimal to severe impacts in various places. However, those countries in the tropics and sub-topics due in part to their poverty and inequities could face very serious challenges in particular places.

As we saw with the human footprint studies, places are more or less wild. Some places have very low human influence indexes and some very high. Our world is full of some relatively wild and some relatively artificial places. Similarly, the effects of anthropogenic climate change will be varied. There will be average increases in temperature but that increase will not occur uniformly over the globe. Moreover, there will be a host of impacts on sea-level rise, tropical storms, precipitation, and biodiversity but these too will not be uniform. Thus, the idea that nature has ended in the absolute sense may be true but that does not demonstrate that everything has become “domesticated” as McKibben alleges. Rather, the human influence will varied even then. To suppose that anthropogenic climate change renders the Cascades, the Amazon, and other relatively wild places equivalent to a shopping mall or parking lot is simply too simple.

Let me now turn the other claim that is crucial to McKibben’s argument. If we remember back it was that if nature ends, then so will our idea of nature. Of course, we found that the idea of nature was not simply the meaning of ‘nature’ in the most simplistic semantic sense, but rather its significance. I grant that McKibben is right that is morally good that people exhibit humility. Insofar as experiences of natural or wild environmental objects promotes or inculcates that virtue, then these objects ought to be preserved. However, McKibben assumes without argument that the only way to promote or inculcate humility is through experiences of natural or wild objects. This I believe to false.

First, as have noted objects are more or less wild and it is plausible to believe that the virtue of humility may still be instilled not only by absolutely natural or wild objects but by relatively natural or wild objects. If I am hiking in the Canadian Rockies and the temperatures are slightly above what they would have been without the CO2 emissions of the last century, is my fear of mountainous exposure, the sight of bear scat, or ominous colds incapable of inducing humility in me? I suggest not.

Recently, McKibben has articulated and defended the notion of the relatively wild.

For me, though, the idea that there’s no such thing as pure wilderness has made the relative wild all the more precious. Yes, Cronon’s right, and so was I – there’s no place that isn’t touched by humanity… But it’s precisely because of such things that we badly need more wild, not less… The deepest cause of our environmental woes is the idea – embedded deep in consumer society – that each of us as individuals is at the center of the world, that our desires are the most important fact of the world, and that we are very, very big. Disproving that fallacy and replacing our hyperindividualism with something a little bit humbler will be the work of decades, but it one of the important functions of wilderness. When you’re in it you feel small, a part of something larger; and by protecting it you pledge yourself publicly to the idea that at least in this place humans should be a little smaller. (2005, 282-283)

Second, even if he concedes the above argument as he has done, why still assume that the only way to inculcate humility is through an experience of relatively natural or wild objects? There are clearly greater forces that any individual human. These forces may be biological, physical, or geological but that can also be human. For example, I once traveled to Shanghai and I do not speak Chinese. Believe you me I came quickly to a sense of humility. In fact, the same sort of feeling could be elicited by seeing the skyline of the Bond or seeing a fleet of Chinese men, women, and children on bikes riding through the traffic filled streets. The point is that humility can be instilled in many ways and experiences of natural or wild objects or even relatively natural or wild objects are not necessary for such inculcation. They are one extremely powerful way to do so but not the only way.

Cronon's Trouble with Wilderness

2006-09-13T15:27:00.000-07:00

Environmental historian William Cronon has written a very deep and important essay entitled “The Trouble with Wilderness; or, Getting Back to the Wrong Nature” in which he provides both a social history of the concept of wilderness and a critique of this concept. As a non-historian, I am not in a position to evaluate many of his historical claims. However, as a philosopher, his arguments are in some cases specious. Given the foundational importance of his essay in environmental history and as a reexamination of our concepts of nature and wilderness, it serves us to examine his views.

Cronon begins his essay with the following,

The more one knows of its peculiar history, the more one realizes that wilderness is not quite what it seems. Far from being the one place on earth that stands apart from humanity, it is quite profoundly a human creation—indeed, the creation of very particular human cultures at very particular moments in human history. It is not a pristine sanctuary where the last remnant of an untouched, endangered, but still transcendent nature can for at least a little while longer be encountered without the contaminating taint of civilization. Instead, it’s a product of that civilization, and could hardly be contaminated by the very stuff of which it is made (1995, 69).

How could wilderness be a “human creation” if it is a place that houses wild objects, processes, and places? It is crucial to note that Cronon is discussing the notion of wilderness as discussed in the Wilderness Act of 1964 and not wildness per se. More specifically, he is discussing designated wilderness – those places explicitly designated to house wildness. They are by definition places that are human creations.

He goes on to write,

Go back 250 years in American and European history, and you do not find nearly so many people wandering around remote corners of the planet looking for what today we would call “the wilderness experience” (ibid, 71).

In fact, in the eighteenth century, wilderness was considered “savage”, “desolate”, and “barren” (1995, 70). Few would have wanted to designate wilderness areas or protection given the terror and violence it contained. In Judeo-Christian tradition, wilderness represented a place of tribulation and testing, it is where Moses led the Hebrews and Jesus fought with the Devil.

However, over time, wilderness was associated with at least two notions, the sublime and the frontier. With regard to the sublime, wilderness was a place to experience God and the transcendent. For example, Henry David Thoreau comments about his experience climbing Mt. Katahdin,

It was vast, Titanic, and such as man never inhabits. Some part of the beholder, even some vital part, seems to escape through the loose grating of his ribs as he ascends. He is more lone than you can imagine …. Vast, Titanic, inhuman Nature has got him at disadvantage, caught him alone, and pilfers him of some of his divine faculty. She does not smile on him as in the plains. She seems to say sternly, why came ye here before your time? This ground is not prepared for you. Is it not enough that I smile in the valleys? I have never made this soil for thy feet, this air for thy breathing, these rocks for thy neighbors. I cannot pity nor fondle thee here, but forever relentlessly drive thee hence to where I am kind. Why seek me where I have not called thee, and then complain because you find me but a stepmother? (1995, 74)

For Thoreau, there is a profound sense of otherness in his climb. Similarly, but with less otherness, John Muir writes about the North Dome in Yosemite Valley,

No pain here, no dull empty hours, no fear of the past, no fear of the future. These blessed mountains are so compactly filled with God’s beauty, no petty personal hope or experience has room to be. Drinking this champagne water is pure pleasure, so is breathing the living air, and every movement of limbs is pleasure, while the body seems to feel beauty when exposed to it as it feels the campfire or sunshine, entering not by the eyes alone, but equally through all one’s flesh like radiant heat, making a passionate ecstatic pleasure glow not explainable.

Wilderness is intimately associated with the religious and transcendent; it is Nature’s cathedral”.

The second tradition views wilderness as “…the best antidote to the ills of an overly refined and civilized modern world was a return to simpler, more primitive living (1995, 76). Those like Theodore Roosevelt began to see wilderness as place of frontier as the west was increasingly commercialized. The irony as Cronon notes is that “[t]he very men who most benefited from urban-industrial capitalism were among those who believed that they must escape its delbilitating effects” (1995, 78). Native Americans were removed from the lands they had inhabited for thousands of years giving the appearance of “‘uninhabitated wilderness’ – unihabited as never before in the human history of the place – reminds us just how invented, just how constructed, the American Wilderness really is” (1995, 79). Parks were designated in places like Niagara Falls, the Catskills, the Adirondacks, Yosemite, and Yellowstone. Whether wilderness is seen as Edenic, sublime, or as a lost frontier, the environmental historian is able to that we have “created wilderness in our own image” (1995, 79).

According to Cronon, leads to a paradox:

[W]ilderness embodies a dualistic vision in which the human is entirely outside the natural. If we allow ourselves to believe that nature, to be true, must also be wild, then our very presence in nature represents its fall. The place where we are is the place where nature is not. If this is so—if by definition wilderness leaves no place for human beings, save perhaps as contemplative sojourners enjoying their leisurely reverie in God’s natural cathedral—then also by definition it can offer no solution to the environmental and other problems that confront us. To the extent that we celebrate wilderness as the measure with which we judge civilization, we reproduce the dualism that sets humanity and nature at opposite poles. We thereby leave ourselves little hope of discovering what an ethical, sustainable, honorable human place in nature might actually look like (1995, 80-1).

He also writes,

If nature dies because we enter it, then the only way to save nature is to kill ourselves. The absurdity of this proposition flows from the underlying dualism it expresses. Not only does it ascribe greater power to humanity that we in fact possess—physical and biological nature will surely survive in some form or another long after we ourselves have gone the way of all flesh—but in the end it offers us little more than a self-defeating counsel of despair. The tautology gives us no way out: if wild nature is the only thing worth saving, and if our mere presence destroys it, then the sole solution to our own unnaturalness, the only way to protect sacred wilderness from profane humanity, would seem to be suicide. It is not a proposition that seems likely to produce very positive or practical results (1995, 83).

Cronon raises interesting issues here but certainly not a paradox.

First, it is incorrect to claim that designating an area as wilderness thereby remove the wildness of the area. Many objects and processes can occur independent of human interventions even in places which are designated as wilderness and in fact may do so because of such designation. If an area is designated as a wilderness area – a human creation – it does not follow that the contents of the area of a human creation. This is to commit a part-whole fallacy.

Second, there are two senses of the term ‘nature’. One includes every material or physical object that exists. The other includes all and only those things that exist independent of human intervention. Clearly, our “stepping into” the former does not destroy nature since in that sense of ‘nature’, we are a part of it. In the second sense, our stepping into it may make it unnatural however we also noted that objects, processes, and places can be more or less natural or wild. Hence, our absence is not necessary for it to be genuine wilderness (read a “wild place”). It depends on the interactions we have with the objects, processes, and place. If in fact, the dynamical processes and objects are largely unaffected by our presence, then it remains wild; otherwise not.

Third, Cronon assumes that wilderness protection is the summon bonum of environmentalism. However, this is clearly incorrect. Wilderness protection is only one strategy of environmentalists for maintaining an “ethical, sustainable, honorable human place in nature” (1995, 81). I would agree that if having such a relationship with nature required the absence of humans, then clearly that would be a collective suicide. But the extremity of this point just highlights the strawman that Cronon has painted. I grant that for some environmentalists like proponents of the Wildlands Project, it may appear that this is the agenda. However, this is the exception not the rule.

In the end, Cronon does raise an excellent question: given that wilderness protection is only one facet of environmentalism, how should we create a sustainable relationship in the natural world? How can we coexist with nature?

Olbermann on Rumsfeld on Facism

2006-08-31T23:24:00.000-07:00

Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld compared the Bush administration's critics to those individuals who attempted to appease and negotiate with the Nazis before World War II. He claimed that the US is up against "a new type of fascism." He said,

I recount that history because, once again, we face similar challenges in efforts to confront the rising threat of a new type of fascism, but some seem not to have learned history's lessons.
Can we truly afford to believe that, somehow or some way, vicious extremists could be appeased?

Many have claimed that Rumsfeld's use of 'appease' was connecting critics of Bush foreign policy to failed "appeasings" of Hitler by the pre-Churchill British government.

Well, I have to say that I haven't seen a journalist or newscaster blast an administration official like Keith Olbermann did on MSNBC. It is a remarkable thing whether you agree or not.

Intrinsic values, Part II - Pragmatism and Pluralism

2006-08-24T22:46:00.000-07:00

Bryan Norton has articulated and defended what he calls the convergence hypothesis: If a sufficiently far-sighted anthropocentrism and non-anthropocentrism agree on common goals and policies, then the "archane debate" over values should be replaced by focus on policy goals. The convergence hypothesis is an empirical hypothesis and must be so judged. This is an interesting challenge to worrying about the notion of intrinsic value. J. B. Callicott has recently argued that the convergence hypothesis is false. Hence, the environmental pragmatism of Norton is unsupportable.

Rather, if the intrinsic value of biodiversity were widely recognized, then sufficient justification must be offered for putting it at risk—just as we demand sufficient justification for putting soldiers at risk by sending them to war. The practical difference that attributing intrinsic value to biodiversity makes it to shift the burden of proof from conservationists who are trying to protect it to those whose actions might jeopardize it.

In fact, he argues that the Endangered Species Act could not have been rationally supported on anthropocentric grounds.This argument is problematic for two reasons as Norton notes .

Callicott assumes that attributions of intrinsic value are necessary for establishing a burden of proof on development, but the full range of human values over intergenerational time surely could establish a similar burden of proof.
Burden of proof is a misnomer given Callicott's subjectivism since subjective preference cannot provide moral justification for preserving biodiversity given their subjective; they will only be relevant to the converted.

Norton's convergence hypothesis might be true. It is certainly possible that the diverse array of environmental values support the same concrete policies. However, it is also possible that there are a small set of values embraced by environmentalists and for non-moral reasons, they differ over environmental policies in a serious way. For example, I imagine if you asked Ted Nordhaus and Michael Schellenberger and Robert Kennedy Jr. about why they value environmental objects, they would provide much of the same reasons. However, N&S bitterly disagree with Kennedy Jr. over whether windmills should be placed in Cape Cod.

However, I completely concur with Norton's pluralism - there a large number of environmental values some intrinsic, some instrumental.* First, each of us values environmental objects for various reasons. Second, no one of those reasons is sufficient to preserve all of the environmental objects of interest. Third, the case for environmental preservation/conservation is strengthened by attending to all of those values since different individuals value objects in different ways and with different intensities. This is value pluralism since these values are not reducible to single type of value.

In the end, I suspect that though intrinsic values are over-discussed; though they do form one part of why we value environmental objects. As such, they should be analyzed especially when folks like Norton argue that they are truly mysterious, but only in proportion to their significance. We mustn't lose sight of practical ethics at the expense of metaethics.

*Actually, as a pragmatist, Norton is skeptical of the very instrumental/intrinsic distinction.

Intrinsic environmental values, Part I

2006-08-23T12:14:00.000-07:00

One of the main controversies in environmental ethics for better or worse concerns whether or not environmental objects (non-human living things, species, communities, ecosystems, landscapes, etc.) have intrinsic value. Traditionally, something has intrinsic value just in case it is valuable for and in itself. It is valuable for itself insofar as its value does not depend on the value of any other object; its value is non-instrumental. It is valuable in itself insofar as its value does not depend on any individual valuing it; its value is non-anthropogenic. Different environmental ethicists have provided different accounts of said intrinsic value and I will just mention two since they represent the basic trajectories of the debate.

One view defended by J. B. Callicott and Robert Elliott essentially argues that something is intrinsically valuable just in case it is valued by an individual for its own sake. This account denies that intrinsic value need be non-anthropogenic. Clearly, many of us value environmental objects intrinsically. Hence, they have intrinsic value.

This account is problematic since it defines what is valuable in terms of what we as a matter of fact value. First, if there had been no valuers nothing would be of value. This is deeply problematic (though Elliott thinks he can avoid this consequence). Second, there are things which are intrinsically valued which are not valuable. For example, John Karr probably values various things for their own sake which are not intrinsically valuable. So, this account won't do.

Another view is defended by Paul Taylor and Holmes Rolston III. Essentially, something is intrinsically valuable just in case it has interests. Something has interests just in case it can be benefited/harmed. For example, if you do not water you houseplants, they will do poorly or to put it in Aristotlean terms, they will not "flourish". Plenty of environmental objects have interests so described (though it is very controversial to suppose that environmental wholes like species, communities, and ecosystems have such interests). Hence, they are intrinsically valuable.

This account has serious problems as well. First, it seems that by taking a sledgehammer to my Honda, I am harming the car or at least I am destroying its proper functioning. Do we really want to say that my car has intrinsic value? Surely not. One might reply that the interests of my car are artifacts of its designer and hence are not the same as that of an environmental object. Fair enough, but why does that matter normatively and can we not run the same argument for non-living, non-artifactual objects like mountains, sandpiles, etc. Second, even if we grant that some environmental objects have interests and why does that imply that we ought to promote those values? In other words, how can we move from is to ought in this case? One way to do so would be to supply the following premise: if x has interests, then x's interests ought to be promoted. However, as John O'Neill has argument, just begs-the-question. Thus, this account is deeply problematic.

Let's start again since I believe we can do better. At this point, I can only sketch an account that avoids the problems above. First, we have to avoid the simple subjectivism of Callicott and Elliott - simply valuing or desiring something does not make it valuable (though I agree that there are no values without valuers). One way of avoiding this is in the following way: something is valuable just in case we desire to desire it. You make desire to eat Twinkies but you don't want to look like one hence you don't desire to desire to eat twinkies. What we desire to desire is a better account of the valuable. Second, we don't want to account for value in terms of what we as a matter of a fact desire to desire since we may lack relevant information, may make inferential missteps, etc. Value thus should be understood in in terms of counterfactual valuings not actual valuings. So, here is such account blending both elements:

Something is intrinsically valuable just in case one would desire to desire it for its own sake under full imaginative acquaintance.

"Full imaginative acquaintance" is a term used by David Lewis in his "Dispositional Theories of Value" and I am co-opting it here. My suggestion is that (a) this account avoids the difficulties above and (b) that certain environmental wholes are intrinsically valuable so described. I won't argue both of those points here (since this is long enough) but will in Part II...

The Hottest Hoax Around!

2006-08-23T00:18:00.000-07:00

Well, the summer is coming to a close and serious blogging will resume I suppose. However, in the spirit of summertime relaxation and in light of the depressing state of national/global politics, I submite the following animation from Mark Fiore. we still need laughs and animator Fiore has come to the rescue. Fiore produces very amusing political cartoons. You can find the Hottest Hoax Around here: markfiore I also suggest looking at his "Animation Gallery" for other good laughs.

John Stewart on the stem cell debate

2006-08-05T16:17:00.000-07:00

Here is a hilarious bit on the stem debate from The Daily Show where Stewart takes on Sen. Brownback, Tony Snow, and President Bush. Watch at your own peril...

Paul Nelson on science education - believe it or not?

2006-08-05T15:26:00.000-07:00

Recently, intelligent design proponent Paul Nelson argued that the recent elections in Kansas removing the conservative school board are relatively unimportant. More generally, he wrote the following:

Rather, my fable was meant to remind people, on all sides of the debate, about what matters. What does not matter is marking a ballot. So, congratulations to those (like Josh) who put in long hours to win the Kansas vote. Here's the bad news: winning will make very little difference in the long run.

That's not sour grapes. That's cold realism. The debate about design vs. no design has been going on since antiquity. Where it counts, in the minds of those one really wants to persuade, like my hypothetical bright 15 year old, school board elections (!) just aren't meaningful or relevant. At all.

Unfortunately, much of the ID movement seems to think that they are. More legal, legislative, or public policy action, they say, is the route to pursue, and the most important goal of all is to affect the public school science curriculum.

I disagree, strongly. What can be won by a vote can be lost by a vote. And science -- the gaining of knowledge -- is not, and never will be, a matter of ballot boxes, lobbying, commercials, billboards, clever campaigns, or any of the rest of the apparatus of political persuasion or force.

This is an interesting line of thought. However, it troubles me.

First, no single school board election will matter much. However, over time such decisions can make a difference. The chief obligation of science educators is not to persuade them of the tenets of evolutionary theory or intelligent design (c'mon, how much evolution do you really learn in high school?). Rather, it is a to create an educated, literate public who can elect similarly educated, literate officials. Since so many issues from climate change to stem cell research require some scientific knowledge, we need students learning the most reliable elements of the scientific corpus. That way, we can avoid senators like Mr. Sam Brownback (R-KS) and Mr. James Inhofe (R-OK) who clearly no very little of the science they discuss (see below for evidence).

Second, I agree science is not simply politics or politics by other means. However, the business of doing science most certainly is about politics. The NSF exists and gives grants because the government views pure research as a worthwhile activity. However, that need not be true and might not always be so. Or, it might be the case that a given administration may decide certain science should not be done or should be ignored.

Third, it is not the business of science educators to "persuade" students to believe in particular theories. They display the scientific theories, models, experiments, methods etc. and show what they can and can't do. Insofar as a student finds the evidence for common descent persuasive for example, they may believe it. However, one can learn quite a bit about a science or some other field without taking a particular stand. As philosophers of science note, one can believe a claim to be true, but one can also accept it for various purposes. Even young earth creationists can accept evolutionary theory - it is the best account of the origins and diversification of living things. I think focusing on persuasion is unhelpful.

Finally, being a bit uncharitable, surely whether or not a given school board election matters is not to be measured by whether a 15-year old finds it "meaningful" or "relevant".

Brownback bringing the crazy

Imhofe on climate change, far-left environmentalists, and Crighton

Eastern Whipbird

2006-07-21T23:43:00.000-07:00

I recently returned from Australia. While I was there, I did some hiking in the Blue Mountains (see picture in previous post) around Katoomba. On my way to the Ruined Castle, I heard a "patch" of bird calls unlike anything I have ever heard. Essentially, each individual call sounded like what I can only describe as the "ping" nose of a submarine's sonar. Now, that is weird, but add twenty or so of these little guys going off in rapid succession. What was peculiar was how this all occurred in the space of one kilometer or so.

After consulting with birder/philosopher Paul Griffiths, I believe what I heard was the Eastern Whipbird, Psophodes olivaceus.

Apparently, the bird song of the species is given by mated pairs. The male begins with a pure note and then a "whip crack". The female then responds with a two syllable response. Finally, whipbirds will offer a chattery scolding when disturbed.

Dr. Dan Merrill at the University of Windsor has determined that the females exhibit different dialects up and down the eastern coast of Australia; however, the males do not (the females will also sing with males who are not their mates, I mean, MATES in the non-australian sense, whew).

So, my hypothesis is that what I heard was a half-dozen or so mating pairs where because of their distance from me, I really mostly heard the males. The rapidity of their calls made it all the more strange. Any rate, here is what a pair sounds like.

This is from Merrill's website:

eastern whipbird

The natures of nature and restoration ecology

2006-07-21T06:49:00.000-07:00

At the moment, I am reading "Infinite Nature" by Bruce Hull. It is an interesting book defending "pluralism" about the nature world. Specifically, there are variety of notions of nature and environmentalists/conservationists would be better served in their political views by using many different notions of natural world in such recommendations. At least, I think that is the view; I am not very far in the book.

Here is the passage of interest.

Looking back through the lens of geological time, we see many natures, not just one nature. The nature present in the area we call Chicago, for example, existed as mowed city park, Native American burned savannas, ice age glaciers, stomping grounds for Jurassic dinosaurs, the submerged floor of a sea separating the east and west coasts of what is now North America, a host for abiotic bacteria struggling into existence on the supercontinent Gondwanaland once located well south of the equator, and, for the first billion years or so of Earth's history, a molten, asteroid-battered rock void of life. Which of these previous natural states is better than another? This is not a trivial question. (2006, 21)

First, the above quote is not a form of "pluralism" about nature so much as the claim that natural world changes. Second, and more importantly, in one sense the question above is a trivial question. I don't know about you, but when I go to the windy city, I don't want to have to face dinosaurs (though frankly I would love to see them in the wild). However, the non-triviality of the question is made more clear below.

How can we justify the nature present at one point in time, say, 1491, as being better than another when we know that many natures have existed and many more can exist? As the book progresses, it will become increasingly obvious that deciding which natures should exist requires imposing human values for which natures we want to exist. (2006, 24)

Restoration ecology is that area of ecology which attempts to restore environments to previously existing states. If one says that we should restore environments to their natural state, clearly Hull has a deep point. Which nature? Even if we intend to restore an environment to a natural state - one where the human influence is minimal, this alone doesn't uniquely specify some pre-ordained moment in geological time.

Incidentally, this is no criticism of restoration ecology per se; just that we must make explicit our commitments to the values of that which is restored. We must ask which natural state do we want our environments restored to?

p.s. The picture above is from Katoomba, Australia of the Blue Mountains. I was recently there enjoying some amazing hiking.

Agent-relativity and Consequentialism

2006-06-09T12:54:00.000-07:00

I am a consequentialist. Moreover, on my view, the moral rightness of an action is dependent only on the consequences of that action and the others available. However, consequentialism has lots of apparent problems. Here is one that is pretty interesting.

Many of us believe that we have "special obligations"; for example, i have a special duties to my family, friends, girlfriend, etc. If i have to choose between saving my sister Katy from drowning or a stranger and the probability of success is equal, then many would say I should save my sister rather than the stranger. Consequentialism seems to deny that such special obligations occur. That is not correct, since consequentialism doesn't tell us what is of value and whether as they say values are agent-relative or agent-neutral. However, many folks think the theory will be agent-neutral.

What this means is that the state of affairs where i save Katy and the state of affairs where I save the stranger will ceteris paribus equal in value. This is a agent-neutral view of value. If one claims that the former has greater value for me, then they subscribe to the view that there are agent-relative values. Common sense then seems to suggest there are agent-relative values and if consequentialism can't make sense of those values, then too bad for consequentialism. Here is a response to this argument.

Let's consider classical utilitarianism just as an example. Consider those two states of affairs again and now ask which action should i undertake - save Katy vs. save stranger. Supposing the amount of pain caused by either drowning is the same, it seems that i should be indifferent between the actions and their consequences. However, i am not. Why not? In the former state of affairs i am a constituent and my tremendous pain matters as does my sister's. In the latter state of affairs I once again am a constituent, but I don't feel the same pain with the loss of the stranger. If i should choose the available action with the best consequences overall, then I should save my sister. This is an example of how considering only agent-neutral values where i am a constituent who is deeply affected by my actions allows us to "mimic" agent-relative values. So, maybe special obligations are not as problematic as is sometimes thought for consequentialism.

Global warming and false dichotomies...

2006-05-22T14:04:00.000-07:00

Recently the libertarian Competitive Enterprise Institute created two commercials disputing global warming or at least its harmful effects probably in response to VP Al Gore's forthcoming movie and book.

http://streams.cei.org/

The commericials conclude with the following "Carbon dioxide. They call it pollution. We call it life." This is a nice example of a false dichotomy. Without greenhouse gases (GHGs) our planet would be ridiculously cold and thus the greenhouse effect is a great thing for us humans. However, fossil fuel use also can also increase average surface temperatures as well. Thus, photosynthesizers need CO2 but we are producing so much GHGs that it will probably have serious repercussions for us and the plants and animals on which we depend. Hence, CO2 levels can have both good and bad effects; it is simply foolish to claim that GHGs are "pollution" or "life".

The same fallacious position is often offered with respect to species extinctions as well. Some argue that since extinction is a natural process, then human-induced extinctions have the same status. The problem is not with extinction per se, but the elevated levels we find today. Extinction can be both important for evolutionary processes but ramped up rates of extinction can be disasterous for the ecosystem services on which we depend.

Upshot: Prefer substance to slogan...

Can Will will global warming away?

2006-04-10T11:04:00.000-07:00

Contrarian George Will in his op-ed piece "Let Cooler Heads Prevail" (see below) offers a remarkable view on climate change. I just wish he would learn some science. Nevertheless, let's consider some of what he writes.

"Eighty-five percent of Americans say warming is probably happening, and 62 percent say it threatens them personally. The National Academy of Sciences says the rise in the Earth's surface temperature has been about one degree Fahrenheit in the past century. Did 85 percent of Americans notice? Of course not. They got their anxiety from journalism calculated to produce it. Never mind that one degree might be the margin of error when measuring the planet's temperature. To take a person's temperature, you put a thermometer in an orifice or under an arm. Taking the temperature of our churning planet, with its tectonic plates sliding around over a molten core, involves limited precision."

Of course it involves limited precision given the fact that it is a empirical measurement. Nevertheless, the IPCC writes, "The best estimate of global surface temperature change is a 0.6 °C increase since the late 19th century with a 95% confidence interval of 0.4 to 0.8 °C".

There are an extremely large number of surface temperature measuring stations on our planet. Moreover, there is heck of a lot of indirect evidence for temperature changes including variations in the snow cover and ice extent, sea level rise, precipitation, cloud cover, El Niño and other extreme weather events. Thus, to claim that the accuracy of these measurements and observations is analogous to putting a thermometer in your armpit is foolish and just lazy thinking.

Will goes on to write,

"While worrying about Montana's receding glaciers, [Montana Gov. Brian] Schweitzer, who is 50, should also worry about the fact that when he was 20 he was told to be worried, very worried, about global cooling".

Will goes on to cite some popular print articles to this effect. It was reasonable to think global cooling could occur given (a) there was a cooling trend between the 40s' and 70s', (b) ice ages follow relatively reliable patterns, and (c) there was debate over the relative effects of aerosol and CO2 "forcings". Nevertheless, Will seems to provide us with the following inference: Given that climatologists were wrong about global cooling, then we should not accept their claims about global warming. They were wrong. Hence, we should not accept their claims. We should at least reject the second premise - things are not the same as they were. First, the cooling was larger in the northern hemisphere rather than in the sourthern which is consistent with the fact that the cooling was caused by sulfate aerosols. Second, we know have reason to believe that sulfate forcings are less than CO2 forcings. Finally, there is good reason to believe that the interglacial period will last fairly long (apprioximately 50,000 yrs). It is interesting that Will believes that since scientists have had false beliefs in the past, the likelihood of having future false beliefs is the same. Doesn't our science get better George?

Last, he writes,

"Are we sure the consequences of climate change -- remember, a thick sheet of ice once covered the Midwest -- must be bad? Or has the science-journalism complex decided that debate about these questions, too, is "over"?"

First, the scientists from the IPCC, The American Meteorological Society, the American Geophysical Union and the American Association for the Advancement of Science all agree that there is a discernible human-caused warming occurring. Second, the general opinion is that there will be some benefits but overall the following will probably occur::

Increase in temperature
Increase in drought and wildfire
Increase in sea level
More intense rainstorms
More powerful hurricanes
Melting glaciers, early ice thaw
Increasing heat waves and spread of disease
Ecosystem shifts and loss of species

Many of these would be bad and could be REALLY bad; and they will affect developing nations more so than the countries that produced greenhouse gas emissions. So, I suggest that Will should not only learn some science but study some ethics - specifically readings on fairness and equality.
_____

(http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/
2006/03/31/AR2006033101707.html)

Global warming...

2006-04-05T16:11:00.000-07:00

Doonesbury on Science Policy

2006-03-07T13:33:00.000-08:00

Problem of composition

2006-02-07T22:25:00.000-08:00

Here is an interesting philosophical problem unrelated to the environment. Consider a mass of clay as it is molded into a statue. The statue is created out of the clay; the parts of the “lump” are rearranged into a statue. Here is the rub. The clay and statue differ in some of their properties. For example, the clay came into existence prior to the statue and the statue cannot survive if it is squashed though the clay can. So,

1. If lump is identical statue, then every property of the former must had by the latter.
2. However, they differ in their historical and persistence properties.
3. Hence, the lump is not identical to the statue.

However, the following argument appears sound.

1. If the lump and statue differ in the historical and modal properties, then they must differ in the properties of their parts.
2. They do not differ with respect to the properties of their parts.
3. Hence, the lump and statue do not differ in the historical and modal properties.

How can the lump and statue exist as numerically distinct individuals though during at least part of their existence they occupy precisely the same place at the same time?

Should grizzlies be delisted in Yellowstone? Not Yet

2005-12-05T23:04:00.000-08:00

The USFWS has officially requested delisting the DPS of grizzly bears in the Yellowstone National Park on November 15, 2005. Since the mid-nineties, the bear population in Yellowstone has been growing between 4% - 7% per year and grizzlies have been observed more than 60 miles outside of their supposed range. Currently, there are believed to be at least 580 grizzlies in the Primary Conservation Area. According to all demographic measures - the number of females with new cubs; the distribution of moms with cubs throughout the Yellowstone area; overall mortality in the bear population of less then 4% - they have “recovered”.

Well, at least is the official story. But there is trouble in them thar hills. There is pressure for agencies to announce success with respect to the ESA. Here are the worries:

a. One half million acres of prime public lands are threatened by industrial-scale oil and gas development in Yellowstone, which would extirpate bears from key areas important to recovery.

b. There is escalating use of public lands by ATVs, combined with federal agencies' failure to enforce road closures, continue to reduce the habitat available for this wilderness dependent species.

c. Private lands comprising important bear habitat are being developed at a run-away pace, severely limiting grizzly use at key times of the year, further isolating Yellowstone bears from other bear populations, and increasing the potential for grizzly bear mortality.

d. Logging and the road building displaces grizzlies from areas that could provide key habitat and food sources.

e. To compound the problem, the four key foods that comprise over 80% of the Yellowstone grizzlies diet (Whitebark Pine Seeds, Yellowstone Cutthroat Trout, ungulates, and Army Cutworm moths) are threatened by exotic species, disease, and climate change.

So, until these issues are dealt with, I think delisting is a very bad idea given the important of grizzlies even just as symbols of the Yellowstone ecosystem.

One common counter-argument to delisting grizzlies is the effect that they have on rancher's livestock. I don't mean to minimize those losses. However, livestock losses to grizzly bears average just 16 cattle and 19 sheep a year in Montana and Idaho compared to total losses of 173,000 cattle and 65,000 sheep due to other causes in 2003 according the U.S. Department of Agriculture. Moreover, groups like Defenders of Wildlife compensate ranchers for lost livestock. So, I think this issue may not be of the importance that is suggested by the media.

Hence, all things considered, I think we have much to lose if we get this one wrong. At the moment, the public can provide comments to the USFWS via email at:

FW6_grizzly_yellowstone@fws.gov.

All comments must be received by February 15, 2006.

Pat Robertson on ID

2005-12-05T15:57:00.000-08:00

Recently, the city of Dover, Pennsylvania removed a group of school board officials who were working tirelessly in challenging evolution being taught in their schools. That ain't nothing new though kudos to the town of Dover. However, Pat Robertson has decided to enter the fray. Here is what he said on the 700 club.

"I’d like to say to the good citizens of Dover: if there is a disaster in your area, don’t turn to God, you just rejected him from your city.”

“And don’t wonder why he hasn’t helped you when problems begin, if they begin. I’m not saying they will, but if they do, just remember, you just voted God out of your city. And if that’s the case, don’t ask for his help because he might not be there.”

Hmmm. Now let me see. The reason why Intelligent Design cannot legally be taught in public schools is because it supposedly does not violate the separation of church and state. I see. But wait, Mr. Robertson threats only make sense if intelligent designer = Judeo-Christian God. But, if that is the case, then that would violate the separation and undercut the whole rationale of teaching ID. Nice slip up Mr. Robertson - you gotta watch your temper.

Katrina and Global Warming

2005-10-22T14:55:00.000-07:00

Several journalists have suggested that hurricane Katrina, and its horrible effects, are the result of the global warming. For example, journalist Rob Gelbspan has made such claims (see http://www.heatisonline.org/). However, at least for the time being, the science cannot show this.

Here is an analogy. Suppose you have a coin biased 60% heads and 40% tails. Thus, the ratio of heads to tails approaches 60:40 as the number of tosses increases without limit. Now on a single throw you get heads. Question: Can you infer that this throw comes up heads because the coin is biased? No. The reason is that bias concerns sequences of coin tossing and not any particular toss.

Similarly, climatologists cannot say any particular hurricane resulted from global warming. What they can show is that as CO2 emissions increase, so will average surface temperature increase. This concerns trends and not specific events. However, computer simulations do predict that global warming will increase sea surface temperatures and thus the intensity (though not the frequency) of hurricanes.

And people say that philosophy is not useful...

Repopulation paradox

2005-09-25T19:35:00.000-07:00

The following "paradox" is due to philosophers Thomas Schwartz and Derek Parfit. We can represent the general argument as follows:

1. If we have moral obligations to posterity, then there must be some group of individuals which we can benefit or harm by our current policy choices; i.e., we must be able to make their lives better or worse.
2. However, there can be no such group since different policy decisions will create different groups of people.
3. Therefore, we have no moral obligations to posterity

As an example, suppose we choose to reduce our CO2 emissions according to the Kyoto Protocol. We now decide either to take public transportation or drive cars. Thus, in virtue of choosing to take buses and shuttles as opposed to driving cars, we will meet different people and ultimately this leads us to have different children than we would have had. Hence, we cannot sensibly ask for a particular group of future people where repopulation occurs, will riding public transportation be more harmful or beneficial to them than driving cars?

However, there is a way for a consequentialist to slip past this "paradox".To see this, a consequentialist could recommend the following principle that avoids the above difficulty.

We should enact policy A rather than policy B just in case whoever exists under policy A would be better off than whoever exists under policy B.

As consequentialists, we attempt maximize the good; in this case, the future good. What matters is not the identity of those future individuals per se; rather, it is the level of well-being of whoever it is that exists then. If under a policy choice between A and B, repopulation will not occur, then we are considering which policy will make that group of future people better off. If under the same policy choice, repopulation will occur, then we are considering which policy will make whoever exists better off under the alternatives. So, maybe the repopulation paradox is not so paradoxical.

ANWR - to drill or not to drill...

2005-08-30T10:50:00.000-07:00

I have been thinking about the Artic National Wildlife Refuge especially after having seen the documentary "Oil on Ice". The documentary is very interesting; however, it does not present both sides of the issue but preaches to the nearly converted.

Nonetheless, it seems that there are powerful arguments against opening up ANWR. First, drilling in the ANWR, and especially area 1002, will have dire effects on the population of caribou since that is a large part of their calving habitat. It could displace them into areas with greater number of predators and ones with less quality food. Second, even if you don't care about caribou, they form a large part of the diet and lifestyle of the Gwitchin people. They intimately depend on caribou for sustenance and do so for thousands of years. If the caribou population is demographically depressed or leave 1002, this would have horrible effects on the already poor Gwitchin community. Third, the U. S. Geological Survey suggests that we will get 6 months of oil from ANWR at most. The "we" is suspect here since EXXONMOBIL would not have to sell the oil to the United States. Ultimately, I am left with weighing the well-being of the caribou (and other affected species) and the Gwitchin people against a very short supply of oil we may never see. The choice seems obvious...

But of course President Bush sees it otherwise. For example, he said: "You know, there's 17 million acres up there -- and all they're asking to do is explore on 2,000 of the 17 million, which, had we done this nearly a decade ago, we'd have an additional million barrels of oil -- of U.S. oil helping to fuel our economy."

This sounds sensible, but as it turns approximately 95% of the Arctic coastline is already open for drilling and exploration.[Okay, the picture is small; but the active drilling along the coast is in red]

Bush also has said in a cabinet meeting: "We had a very interesting discussion about capacity. For example, had ANWR been passed -- had it not been vetoed in the past, we anticipate an additional million barrels of oil would have been coming out of that part of the world, which would obviously have a positive impact for today's consumers."

Suppose it had - ignoring the time lag of harvesting the oil.l As Mark Sagoff has often argued, Americans (and Canadians since this affects them too) are not just consumers, we are citizens as well.

Frist's Follies

2005-08-29T18:35:00.000-07:00

Recently Senate Majority Leader Bill Frist offered his thoughts on the subject of intelligent design and evolution. Specifically, he argued that intelligent design should be taught alongside evolutionary theory presumably in elementary and high school.

http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/9008040/

He said, "I think today a pluralistic society should have access to a broad range of fact, of science, including faith..." and that exposing children to both evolution and intelligent design "doesn't force any particular theory on anyone. I think in a pluralistic society that is the fairest way to go about education and training people for the future."

It seems that Frist makes several assumptions that many (including myself) find deeply problematic. First, most would agree in a pluralistic society, one should have "access" to a broad range of information. 'Information' is the right word since one cannot just suppose there are facts that only the "faithful" have access to. However, one can have free access to such information without it being taught in public schools. Second, it is inane to assume that teaching a single theory forces a theory on students as if teaching two or more theories prevents the coersion. There is a rich tradition in the history of science of viewing certain theories as useful instruments which do not deserve full belief. A student can recognize the useful predictive power say of evolutionary theory, and deny it as completely true for other reasons. Third, if we are to be genuinely fair, then we must teach any and every religious account of how life has changed through time alongside evolutionary theory. No ID proponent really can be suggesting that including Frist.